Investing the Assets of Public Pension Funds in California: Fiduciary Responsibility Under the \u27Prudent Person Rule\u27 by Senate Committee on Public Employment and Retirement
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
California Senate California Documents
3-11-1986
Investing the Assets of Public Pension Funds in
California: Fiduciary Responsibility Under the
'Prudent Person Rule'
Senate Committee on Public Employment and Retirement
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/caldocs_senate
Part of the Legislation Commons
This Hearing is brought to you for free and open access by the California Documents at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in California Senate by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Senate Committee on Public Employment and Retirement, "Investing the Assets of Public Pension Funds in California: Fiduciary
Responsibility Under the 'Prudent Person Rule'" (1986). California Senate. Paper 153.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/caldocs_senate/153

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
7 
18 
19 
21 
22 
26 
MEETING 
SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND RETIREMENT 
STATE CAPITOL 
ROOM 2040 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 
TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 1986 
2:00 P.M. 
27 Cathleen Slocum, C.S.R. 
License No. 2822 
28 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION (916) 362-2345 
n 
,...... 
~ 
~ 
()0 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
6 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
ii 
MEMBERS PRESENT 
Dan McCorquodale, Chairman 
Paul Carpenter 
MEMBERS ABSENT 
Art Torres 
Marian Bergeson 
Ed Royce 
STAFF PRESENT 
Dick Damm 
David Felderstein 
Shirley Smaage, Secretary 
ALSO PRESENT 
Assemblyman David Elder 
Assemblyman Louis Papan 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION (916) 362-2345 
INDEX 
2 Investing the Assets of Public Pension Funds in 
California: duciary Responsibility under the 
3 "Prudent Person Rule" 
4 I. Introduction and Overview 
5 Senator McCorquodale 
1 
1 
6 II. What is prudent judgment and how is the 2 
standard of fidciary responsibiity to be interpreted 
7 under the "prudent person rule"? What is the legal 
liabili for breach of trust? 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
21 
22 
23 
25 
26 
28 
David West - Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 
Questions 
Ethan Lipsig 
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 
Questions 
III. Legal and practical conflicts in the 
impl ementa ti on of Propositi on 21 
Richard Gilbert 
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe 
stions 
IV. Models of im ementation programs. How 
the funds decide to invest under Proposition 21. 
2 
10 
26 
29 
34 
34 
38 
44 
Richard Yankee 44 
San Bernardino County Employees' Retirement Assn. 
stions 
Sid McCau and 
Public Employees' Retirement System 
stions 
47 
53 
57 
V. Are fund managers exerc1s1ng the same prudence 78 
as trustees? Does the obligation of Proposition 
21 extend to managers? 
John Graf 78 
Citicorp Investment Management Company 
Questions 83 
PETERS SHO AND REPORTING CORPORATION (916) 362-2345 
iii 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
9 
10 
11 
2 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
22 
24 
25 
28 
VI. 
funds 
ng f due ary un 
red 
21: 
oyees' Re rement System 
ions 
Pa ri Brunner 
Oran Coun oyee 
educa ion and investm 
Carol S ck 
i rement stem 
expertise for trustees 
Sacramento County Employees' Re rement Assn. 
Adjournment 
Certi cate and Re ter 
R RT 916 362 45 
89 
93 
95 
1 01 
101 
109 
, 10 
1 
1 
3 
Begi our r n n n nv ng the Assets of Public 
5 Pens on unds in California: Fiducia Responsibili under 
6 the 'Prudent Per son Rule.' 
7 
8 
Two y ars go the 
ch was brou t to the ot 
ic oted for Pro sition 21 
Ass em man Papan. That 
9 ini ative which is now Ar cle XVI, Section 17 of the State 
1 0 Constitution replaced a rather 1 engthy and overly 
11 conservative set of investment rules with a prudent person 
12 rule. Rules imiting investments to companies that have 
13 several consecutive quarters dividends, several 
14 consecut e profitable years and have already reached their 
15 growth poten al have been re aced by a requirement that 
16 
18 
9 
21 
22 
28 
trustees need 0 to exercise pr t judgment in the 
a nistratio of th r i estme d ties. 
What does a mea or the $70 to $80 billion in 
pe on a s erned c pen on fund 
a , as a Sen tor representing a portion of 
m n ong other ngs, that the 
enorm s 1 pre nte e growth of the 
ec s does not e to be missed in the 
as t e As er teacher and 
member publi pen on systems for over 20 years, it 
means my e bene its the system will not be 
1 imi ted a ted of nvestment. $80 billion 
is just too large hi e m tress. However, with 
6) 362-
2 
1 the increased opportunity comes an uncertainty in 
2 implementing the prudent person rule. We've been 
3 mysteriously told that prudent in conjunction with the 
4 prudent person rule is a process and not a decision to invest 
5 in a particular stock, bond or building. Curiously, we are 
6 told that diversification and pooling create the opportunity 
7 to become nearly risk free in our investments. 
8 Equally as puzzling, we are told the six-inch volume 
9 of ERISA, Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 
10 standards will make the process all that much more lucid. 
11 However, even on that score, I've been told by a former U.S. 
12 Labor Department Administrator this last week that ERISA 
13 really stood for "every rotten idea since Adam." Needless to 
14 say, today's hearing is to shed our own light on 
15 implementation of Proposition 21. We hope to find out what 
16 is intended in lay terms by prudent judgment. We hope to 
17 find out how the funds have chosen to implement Proposition 
18 21 and where our pension money has been invested. 
19 Finally, we hope to find out about problems funds 
20 are having in their implementation of the initiative and how 
21 the Legislature might correct those problems. 
22 Our first witness today is David West, who is with 
23 the firm of Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher. 
24 I'm told that the microphone over there won't work, 
25 so we'll just use the two that are here. So you can just--
26 it's all right, you ca~ keep your back to everybody and sit 
27 there. It will be easier for you. 
28 MR. WEST: Thank you, Senator, ladies and gentlemen. 
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A udence mea s. 
been described 
of 
a you know, is establ shed 
rement systems. The Public 
oyees 1 Retirement stem or S, State Teachers' 
stem, or S S, the Cou Retirement 
stem CE and a ous Loc l 
Employees' Retirement 
cy Pension Trusts 
ch I' 11 all 
Prior to Proposition 21 ch was approved by the 
voters of this 
each of 
c stit 
ese 
on 
te on June 5th, 19 
st s was governed 
statutes under 
asset investment for 
Art cle 16 of the 
e Governmen , Education 
and nance des ti e v i es in which system 
asset co d b invested. e minimal discretion in the 
nvestm of s was co ferr d, 1 e res nsibility was 
s 0 i e 16, Section 17, provided 
t Le co a 0 e p to percent of the 
ssets a c pension or re rem fund to be invested 
comm n e er ent n preferred stock in 
rpo mi im asset earnin c teria. 
e e ns percenta of a 
rpora on 1 a tha 0 r a sed any one d, 
and the p fund assets at could be 
est f a e cor po r a t i on . 
on stock b re stere on the 
Nationa S XC nge XC i the case of the common 
4 
1 stock of certain banks and insurance companies. 
2 Each type of fund was, in addition, subject to its 
3 own set of guidelines. The corporate equity limitations were 
4 at least equivalent to those of the Constitution. Specific 
5 statutory provisions authorized and limited the extent to 
6 which individual funds could invest in real estate and debt 
1 instruments. Certain provisions authorized the retention of 
8 investment counsel, trust companies or trust departments of 
9 banks to advise the governing body of a fund regarding its 
10 investment program. 
11 There essentially was no objective prudence 
12 requirement applicable to PERS, STRS and CERS. Each of the 
13 funds, however, was expressly subject to limits imposed on 
14 savings banks and Section 1372 of the Financial Code 
15 applicable to savings banks and public retirement funds to 
16 the extent that the funds were to be governed by savings bank 
17 rules, imposed a subjective prudence requirement by 
18 authorizing certain investments in which in the informed 
19 opinion of the respective boards or officers charged with the 
investment of funds of such systems it is prudent to invest 
21 retirement funds. 
22 The statutory provision governing investment 
23 authority for LAPT, the Local Agency Pension Trusts, however, 
24 did contain an objective prudence standard. That provision 
25 authorized investment permissible under Section 2261 of the 
26 Civil Code and Section .2261 applicable generally to trusts 
21 required that in managing trust property one must, quote, 
28 "exercise the judgment and care under the circumstances then 
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preva 1 g w c men pr dence, disc an int 11 nee 
exercise n e managemen f e own a airs .•• " unquote. 
Se ion 17 
siti n 2 as ha bee state , amended 
icle 6 of the State Constitution to provide 
gi ature may authorize the investment of monies 
ic pension or r irement system subject to four 
that e 
any 
new cond ens. Fir t a sets pension fund would 
considered t us funds he or the exclusive purpose of 
providing nefits to par cipants and beneficiaries. 
Second a fiduciary of the fund must discharge his or her 
duti s with espect to the funds sole for the interest 
and excl pur ses of iding benefits to participants 
a be cia es, n ing employer contributions 
and defraying re sonable expe ses admi ni stra on. 
ird, e duciary the fund must discharge s 
e with re ct to the sy em w th the care, 
e d i nee under circum stances t 
er the prudent person acting in a like 
ca c f ili with these matters wo d use in the 
t e r se a 11 aracter and w like 
a s. r the duciary e fun must d ersi 
nvestm of e em so as t minimize ri 0 
cir 
ecti 
se 
t maximize the rate of eturn ess under the 
ances i is clearly prudent not to do so. 
nection w Prop 21 ~ le slation was ado d 
e amended p s ons o 
th above systems. 
a ha n to elimi 
RE ING 
the canst tut on in the 
e es t of Prop 21 and 
te e previous 
I (916) 362- 45 
6 
1 investment menu and place an affirmative responsibility on 
2 appropriate fund personnel to prudently invest fund assets. 
3 Now, as has also been mentioned, Prop 21 and the 
4 related legislation were formulated to follow the fiduciary 
5 responsibility rules included in ERISA. Section 404 of ERISA 
6 provides that a fiduciary must discharge his duties with 
7 respect to the plan solely in the interests of the 
8 participants and beneficiaries for the exclusive purpose of 
9 providing benefits and defraying reasonable expenses of 
10 administration with the care, skill and prudence and 
11 diligence under the circumstances then prevailing and by 
12 diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize 
13 the risk of large losses unless it is clearly prudent not to 
14 do so and in accordance with plan documents. 
15 The similarities between ERISA and the new 
16 California provisions are fairly obvious. Each includes 
17 essentially three charges. That the plan is to be maintained 
18 for the exclusive benefit of participants, that fiduciaries 
19 must act prudently and, third, the plan investments must be 
diversified. 
21 There are, however, some noteworthy differences. 
22 First, the ERISA provisions clearly address all aspects of 
an operation and administration. The new California 
24 provisions clearly address plan asset management but except 
25 in the case of PERS and STRS it's arguable that the new 
26 criteria do not cover ~ther aspects of plan administration 
unrelated to asset management. 
28 Second, the ERISA provisions are directed to 
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fiduciar s, se with r spons ili and discre on over 
an a rs nd not those w perform ministerial tasks 
al ou ta utes erning PERS, s and CERS are 
addressed to fficers and employees of the board of a fund. 
new pr sions governing LAPT are directed to the 
1 slative bo , trust or other body authorized to make 
inve ents. t is questionable whether California 
provisions real directed to employees and intended to 
9 cover those performing ministerial tasks. 
10 Third, the thrust of the ERISA exclusive benefit 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1 
r e is t different. It is or it has come to be 
primar des to prevent conflicts of interest 
pa c ar where an fiduciaries also serve as officers of 
ir sponsori em oyers. In addition, ERISA' s exclusive 
benefit rule co ns no statements that a purpose the 
fund s to m ze employer contributions. This is now one 
1 of ex sive purposes of a public system, but is a notion 
vj 
19 Fourth, ER requi es that assets be diversified to 
20 ent risk f large losses Prop 21 provides that 
21 iver ification must be effected to prevent losses la or 
sma I seem t the California statute pose a 
ea r of d ersification. 
2 Fif ER contains a detailed statutory apparatus 
for the all at and delegation of fidu iary 
nsib Al thou M • Lipsig w 11 ela orate on thi 
point fur 1 me briefly describe this. ERISA impo 
the re n 1 for an asset management on the an's 
45 
8 
1 ustees, unless such responsibility has been reserved by a 
2 so-called named fiduciary who has overall accountability, or 
3 this named fiduciary has appointed a statutory investment 
4 manager, meaning either a bank, insurance company or a 
5 registered advisor. 
6 Now, proper reservation of responsibility to a named 
7 fiduciary with delegation to investment managers should serve 
B to exonerate the trustee from responsibility to the extent 
9 of the reservation or delegation. In addition, proper 
10 delegation to an investment manager should serve to exonerate 
11 the named fiduciary except to the extent the delegation was 
12 or becomes imprudent. Notwithstanding a proper reservation 
13 delegation, all fiduciaries can still under certain 
14 conditions be responsible for the acts and conduct of their 
15 co- duciaries. 
16 Sixth, ERISA expressly prescribes that fiduciaries 
17 will be personally liable for losses occasioned to the plan 
18 as a result of their breach; and finally, seventh, ERISA 
19 expressly authorizes indemnification of fiduciaries for 
20 liabilities but not from plan assets. Insurance can, under 
21 certain conditions, be purchased with plan assets. 
In California, the California Public Liability Act 
may be of some utility in protecting public fund employees. 
Again, on the sixth and seventh points Mr. Lipsig will 
25 elaborate further. 
26 Now, what does. prudence really mean? The 
27 1 egi sl a tiv e hi story to ERISA and the Department of Labor 
Regulations promulgated under Section 404 provides some 
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with r spect to the total an portfolio. 
e rta n nvestmen s w ch themselves may rna 
s cert n hed ng strategi s involving options 
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1 
2 
f owing a d igent and careful procedure of evaluation. 
AIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Excuse me. Did you have a 
3 question? 
4 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Well, I just wondered if we 
10 
5 could have that, give that to her and let her type it in, and 
6 we could maybe get to I mean, this is getting to be 
7 uni ntell igi bl e, frankly. I just want to tell you that. 
8 MR. WEST: I do have a few comments that I think 
9 will be 
10 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: I mean, you've got so many 
11 caveats in there. That would scare J. Paul Getty. He would 
12 never have made a nickel with what you're--
13 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: He probably wouldn't qualify 
14 as a prudent man. 
5 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Probably not. His activities 
6 have been curtailed a great deal, I think. 
17 I guess, really, my whole quarrel with this is that 
18 it seems to me we should as pension people suggest some 
9 minimum level of guaranteed rate of return. Every year we 
ou t to adopt that as a Board. If it doesn't pay that much, 
then we don't invest. And in the absence of that we put the 
money in Treasury Bills which is about as safe as anything 
can be. 
24 What you've got there, you can criticize or justify 
anybody's decision on everything. Just because, I mean, that 
criteria goes on and on and on. 
MR. WEST: I think, sir, that --
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Isn't that what it's intended to 
P ERS SHORTHAND REPO ING CORPORATION (916) 362-2345 
2 
do so t you ba 
wante to in the 
R. W 
could do whatever the hell you 
ise of a udent person? 
W 1, I think that the prudence standard 
4 is twofold. First 1 s the portfolio theory that I mentioned 
5 and second is the procedure and --
6 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: I don't buy the portfolio 
7 
8 
9 
theory, frank 
with a ki 
ought to ask our 
it doesn't pay 12 percent guaranteed 
are you doing it? That's really what we 
es and that would certainly lower the 
10 cost of doing business as far as the taxpayers are concerned 
11 and maybe do some ng really crazy like maybe give a little 
12 crumb bet pension for some of our public employees. 
13 MR. W Well, I think --
14 LYMAN ELDER: The point was to stipulate, then 
15 if you co d nd summarize it. 
1 MR. WEST: w 1, sir. 
17 procedur aspects would be satisfied by 
ry steps of due d igence and conscientious 
1 on d te ne appropriateness of a particular 
20 ent 
rea na e investors may well differ over the 
r estment. But to extent that 
a es have sked e ri t questions and examined the 
documents and so forth, such duciaries sho d not 
e osses if the investment fails. 
26 Now legal su cient procedure w l necessarily 
depend on e acts and circumstances. So in evaluating a 
2 poten ial loan transaction it's fairly clear that prudence 
ING CORPO (916) 45 
12 
1 would demand that the fiduciaries evaluate the borrower's 
2 nancial condition and ability to make payments. 
3 Now, in the case of a prospective venture capital 
4 investment, does prudence require subjecting the entrepreneur 
5 or promoter of the investment to a psychiatric examination? 
6 Some venture capitalists do this routinely. 
7 To the portfolio and procedure concepts 
8 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: So if you don't do that then 
9 you're not doing the prudent person thing because somebody 
10 did it once? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
5 
6 
17 
8 
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21 
22 
MR. WEST: And if the investment fails or it could 
be a breach. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Doesn't that sort of steer you 
aw from venture capital into the stock market? It kind of 
does that, doesn't it? 
MR. WEST: Well, if reasonable, if reasonable people 
wo d say that it would not under the circumstances be 
necessary, and there are those venture capitalists who 
probably believe it is unnecessary. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Basically what you're saying is 
if it loses money, you're going to get, then you won't get 
sued which is a hell of an imperative. 
MR. WEST: You may be sued, but it doesn't necessary 
mean you'll lose. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: That's lovely, three to five 
26 years later on with your life. 
MR. WEST: I think that you should --
28 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: You're an attorney, aren't you? 
S SHORTHAND REPO CORPORATION (916) 362-2345 
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2 EMB t's w you re com ta e in 
3 a cou setti g. 
CHAIRMAN McCORQ E: T turn it around the other 
5 way, suppose that at the end of the year you look and most 
6 making 15 percent and you were returning only investors w 1 re 
7 
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10 
11 
12 
13 
1 
15 
1 
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2 
en percent. 
MR w T: Well, if ten percent is acceptable to 
meet the an's funding obligations or criteria, and every 
an has some ection of what its needs are going to be, 
it's real ng to be hard to say t ten percent is 
udent if there has been the necessary amount of study and 
ev ua on to demonstrate that ten percent, that a ten 
per eturn was fine. 
thi 0 r, in a 1 tion to portf io and 
pro d tha portant in complying wi prudence is 
a ea under ER e courts have made it clear that 
ence w 1 be ev uated against an expert standard. So in 
cou t t may well bo down to a ba e of expert 
timony 
ven the proliferation of professional money 
g t r to say t there are expert 
tandards that are dentifia e and the blic funds that are 
be f ng the ER A model sho d look to out de 
exper usti and help them make these decisions. 
McCORQ E: If you ve got a 
titut requirement to minimize the employer 
o t bu u re not only talking about the f d 
ER AN R RT COR PO ION (916) 362-2345 
14 
1 needs to stay sound, you're talking about ev~n going further 
2 than that and then if you throw into that the addition of the 
3 maximized employee benefit, member benefits, how do you put 
~ all those together? 
5 MR. WEST: Well, I think that is a significant 
6 difference between the ERISA prudence concept and the Prop 21 
7 concept. Minimizing employer contributions is alien to the 
8 ERISA notion of prudence. So that necessarily means that it 
9 could be viewed as an obligation to take more risk as opposed 
10 to preserve capital, and there will have to be probably a 
11 different standard between preservation of, a different 
12 balancing standard between preservation of capital and 
13 acceptable risk under Prop 21 because of that one element 
1~ that you have mentioned. 
15 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: You think there's an 
16 advantage in California having a Prop 21 versus ERISA or 
17 should the state come into line simply with ERISA? 
18 MR. WEST: I think that because of this element of 
19 minimization of employee contributions, and because Prop 21 
in its legislative framework do not impose, do not seem to 
se liability on fiduciaries and it's arguable, and there 
are arguments that can be made that they shouldn't because 
e timate payor of the liability is the taxpayers of this 
state, that I think that these differences mean that the 
standar should not necessarily be the same. And that 
perhaps, as Mr. Elder ~as mentioned, there should be built in 
some sort of minimum return. You have to do whatever you 
have to do to return at least ten percent, 11 percent, 
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whatever Treas B s can do beyond t then you're 
acti at, ou 1 re acti under the prudence rule. 
DAM: How ould you a to compare 
investment prospectively against Mr. Elder's suggestion, ten 
or 11 percent? How can you guarantee at equities will 
return that in any given year? 
MR. WEST: Well, you can never guarantee. 
DER: You can buy equities and pay 
that. You can get pr erred stock. 
MR. WEST: Well, there are preferred stocks in 
established companies that do that, but if we're talking 
about aring in growth of another Silicon Valley --
ASS LYMAN Or loss 
MR. WEST: sharing the growth or loss of another 
ico V 
ing the ce in other 
wor s 
. w -- then you real can't talk about 
arantee or you can talk about 
ling in the 
And t' s an ari 
that much. 
ELDER: You can look and see what it's 
per at and what it's going to mature at. 
etic calcula on that it's going to pay 
24 MR. T: But I would think that by looking at 
25 in tu onal esta i d investments like your bonds and 
clea i en f e things of that sort, that you were ruling 
out venturing into areas that have the possibility of showing 
P ERS RATION (916) 362-
1 
16 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: I'm just saying that if you take 
2 a billion dollars and put it at 12 percent in~erest for 30 
3 years, you have $29 b lion. If you buy stock with it you 
4 have stock which may be worth something, nothing, whatever. 
5 And I think, you know, in terms of our responsibilities to 
6 the taxpayers and as well as the taxpayers who are also 
7 public employees, they'd much rather have the $29 billion for 
8 sure if we can guarantee the 12 percent return and deal in 
9 real estate and other investments that yield as high as that. 
10 Treasury Bills got to 17 percent, and we weren't buying any 
11 of them. I think that was criminal because we could have 
12 locked in 17 percent for 30 years. Now they're down to a 
13 little under eight. 
14 MR. WEST: Well, then perhaps some sort of 
15 compromise will have to be reached. 
6 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: My purpose would be every year 
17 the PERS Board, the STRS Board or the University of 
18 California says this is what we can expect in this business 
19 climate, and if it doesn't pay that much we're not going to 
buy it. That seems to me to be the height of prudence. And 
2 what you're describing is the height of confusion. 
MR. WEST: Well, there are 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: That's why you need people like 
you to come around and explain to poor stupid folks like us 
what it means because we can't just tell by reading it. And 
the poor scribes out there trying to write down what you're 
saying, other than her, are going to be virtually, you know, 
nonplussed. 
s 0 AND REPORT CORPORATION (916) 362-2345 
1 MR. W Well, is is, I think the because of 
2 the taxpayer element that you've mentioned, I think that that 
3 ange make ence conce under Prop 1 and under 
4 ERISA, I think it does make them very different. Since we're 
5 dealing with ople's retirement money and w th people's 
6 taxes, perhaps just giving PERS and STRS investment personnel 
7 a ee hand is not necessarily going to achieve a ran teed 
8 u n. 
9 However, what the prudence standard should do or 
10 could do is, assuming that you are returning an acceptable 
11 amount, an acceptable amount would be that which the PERS or 
12 blic funds person would have to determine. There 
13 should be some op rtuni ty in the system for a public fund to 
14 invest in a Silicon Valley. That opportunity should be 
15 there. 
17 
8 
9 
quest on of how you go about deciding where the 
next con V ey is or where a venture that could turn a 
hi rate return and at the same time be benefic! to the 
state as uming that at is a criteria that sho d be taken 
20 into account, that' where ERISA prudence can be useful. 
21 MBL ER: Well, prev ous to Silicon Valley 
the one knew of before the one that you're talking 
a s i San nci sco. You're not suggesting we invest 
1 res like that? 
T: No, I'm not, but I think that the means 
26 ev ua ng kinds of pos b i es has 
--
EMB ER: It was a very profita e 
28 enterp se e w invo ed in. 
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1 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Has there been any 
2 litigation since Prop 21 related to public funds for 
3 improvement management? 
4 MR. WEST: I'm not aware of any. 
5 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: How about under ERISA, have 
6 there been any? 
7 MR. WEST: There have been cases under ERISA 
8 involving imprudent management, but the ones that actually 
9 get litigated and decided usually involve --well, they're 
10 the horrible cases where there have been affirmative acts of 
11 moral turpitude, there's been soft dealing involved and where 
12 there is a clear failure on the part of the fiduciaries of 
13 the plan to just go into the investment willy-nilly without 
14 giving consideration to any of the factors that even a casual 
15 investigator would have considered. 
16 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: So maybe Mr. Cory is the 
17 only one affected by the prudent man rule. 
18 (Laughter.) 
MR. FELDERSTEIN: You have stated that the inclusion 
20 in Prop 21 of the language that part of the fiduciary 
21 responsibility was to minimize employer contributions, that 
is not in the ERISA language, but it's in the Prop 21 
language. You said that that could make a significant 
difference in the interpretation of what is and what is not a 
prudent investment. Could you talk a little bit more about 
that? 
MR. WEST: Well, I think the absence of that 
language in ERISA means that if an investment, it reflects 
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the fact at if an inves n fa s or the an cannot 
2 its o i ons, it's up to the em oyer to fund the 
an and ER A has a d tailed scheme for funding a 
4 pension , that is the em oyers who have these ans have 
5 to contribute yeah amount a year to make sur that the an 
6 can meet 1 ts promises. But the timate source of this is 
7 em oy e • 
8 em oyer is I think clearly distinguishable from 
9 the taxpayers who really should not have to be made to pay 
10 for the imprudence or the mistakes of PERS personnel who are 
1 1 respo e. But in a practical setting, I think in doing 
12 the evaluation, you would look at an investment. You have to 
13 be ndful of the taxpayers having to have their 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
1 
21 
24 
contributions 
I 
mized. 
it places perhaps a greater emphasis on 
rate of return than there is in the ERISA get 
sett 
g hi 
because a higher rate of return will reduce 
ontribu o o I think the balance between preservation 
of ca tal and rate of return would be a little different in 
ornia sense an it wo d under ERISA. I think 
A is proba more i erested in preservation of capital 
an a rate of return. C ifornia the emphasis might be 
e on rate of return. 
AIRMAN McCO UODALE: All ght. Did you have 
anymore? 
M WEST Well, I had some general comments of a 
iloso ic nature on what prudence could mean in the --
28 ther e been questions about what prudence sh d mean in 
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1 the ERISA context at any rate. 
2 The climate has changed somewhat since ERISA was 
3 passed in 1974. Clearly now, more so than then, pension 
4 funds, both public and private, virtually owned the nation's 
5 wealth. And thus, pension funds are the market in stocks and 
6 bonds. And so as a mathematical matter, it is impossible for 
7 all pension funds, public and private, to beat the market. 
8 It just can't be done because they are the market. Hence, 
9 the emphasis on short-term profits might be a bit misplaced. 
10 In addition, the pressure put on companies by 
11 institutional managers has been criticized by those who 
12 deplore the pursuit of short-term profits at the expense of 
13 the long-term development of the viability and 
14 competitiveness of American enterprise. 
15 What that means practically is that companies and 
16 businesses worrying about satisfying investors may be 
17 sacrificing long-term projects and developments in order to 
18 show a short-term profit. 
19 And finally, as owners of the nation's wealth, 
retirement funds in the aggregate may as a moral matter need 
21 to be concerned with other things as well; that is, avoiding 
speculative ventures, those get-rich-quick type ventures and 
they might consider embracing the deployment of fund assets 
in socially useful enterprises that enhance the business 
climate, business and employment climates in this state and 
its various localities. 
Now, that's an ERISA, problem that has been raised 
28 under ERISA prudence and there's another example, sir, of how 
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the absence of the mi imization of em oyer-employee 
2 contributions or taxpayer contributions mi t affect any 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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12 
13 
decision n s em sign 
CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: 
questions? 
cant 
1 right. Any other 
EMB ELDER: Mr. Chairman, if we're in the 
market, as pu ic sector pension funds are, then 
everything we do effects what we So is is kind of 
like perpetu motion almost. It•s like there really isn't 
any guidance by it except the dollar volume that goes into 
it. I nd, you know, not asking for a stated rate of 
return be irresponsi e. 
MR. W Well, so many private funds and even 
14 pu ic funds to my knowledge have gone, because they're aware 
15 tha i the a gate cannot beat the market, they've 
6 gone n f ind xed type of funds where ey tie th r 
7 e ents e S & P 5 or the W shire Index. Even 
19 
20 
21 te 
er e i no guaranteed rate of return, but at least you 
d no wor e than average. 
R Isn't at awful if you're 
ng prudent expert rule and n you're saying 
a we t do a worse an 
at's t contradictory g 
e average? I mean 
s. It seems to me 
ceed here, you real want to ucceed in the stock 
ar ow 
co 
return of capi 
, se s for yourself and yo '1 succeed. 
s 
p E 
ern with e stock market basically with the 
retu n on ca tal -- and I think Will 
d he was more concerned with e return of his 
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1 ca tal than the return on his capital, and of course he was 
2 in a different time. But my point is that stocks in capital 
3 appreciation which is given better tax grouping is of no 
4 advantage to public pension funds because we don't have taxes 
5 to pay. 
6 So one of the principal advantages of the stock 
7 market does not exist for pension funds. We have to be 
8 concerned with paying out benefits. So income is a principal 
9 driving requirement of why we invest. And yet it seems that 
10 its given a back seat as we attempt to do no worse than the 
11 best or best than the worst in terms of doing these index 
12 funds. It doesn't make any sense to me that the current 
13 income should be the principal reason and driving force 
14 behind why we invest because we don't pay taxes. That's not 
15 true of other taxpayers. It's different. 
16 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: We've been joined by Mr. 
17 Papan. Do you have any questions of our witness? 
18 ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: The consultant just filled me 
19 in briefly and I didn't see the distinction that he was 
making, Senator. In one of the paragraphs it said that we're 
going to have to think in terms of reducing the employer 
contribution while enhancing the employee benefit. Is that 
the difference between the ERISA standard we have here in 
California? 
MR. WEST: I think that that is one of the elements 
of the difference. The idea of reducing employer 
contributions is not in ERISA. 
28 ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: But it's consistent with the 
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idea of mana ng 1 a shion that wo d bring the greatest 
return. re 1 s only two principals here, the employee and 
the em oyer You can't think in-- that came about because 
Senator sell wanted it in there to stroke his conservative 
idea that he best identifies with the employer whoever that 
may be. Other than that, it's very consistent in principal I 
wo d think, Mr. Chairman. 
T: I think that broadly speaking it is. In 
terms of em asis though, I think the degree is one of 
difference in shading as opposed to difference in kind. 
I nk there may be, because of the minimization of 
em oyer contribution elements in Cal ornia, that that 
arguab 
return. 
comprehen 
money s 
means 
ASS 
ng 
at bu 
ere could be a greater emphasis on rate of 
PAPA.N: I w d have trouble 
tement. · body mana ng portfolio 
t-in requirement by the standard of a 
pru ent person r e than the ISA standards. It may not be 
identica , but I don t think it flies in the face of what the 
fede standard s surely. 
a d I 
nd a 
a cad 
MR. WEST: No, I don't think it does in the long run 
nk that both systems are de 
the same preserve ca tal. 
gned to maximize return 
And w n these 
c 0 , y ow, ph oso c distinctions come into 
ay, how they would a in a given situation I couldn 1 t 
26 ay, bu ther probably would be situa ons where it would be 
eva e would not be very many of em. 
28 Are you saying if a sy em would 
45 
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1 decide to reduce the employer contributions, that they would 
2 be violating the prudent person rule? We're not saying that? 
3 MR. WEST: No. It would have to balance that 
4 consideration against the obligation to get a return. 
5 ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: That's a fine distinction that I 
6 wasn't aware of, Mr. Chairman. 
7 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Well, it seems like -- is it 
8 more important than to look at the rate of return or the 
9 process that's followed? 
10 MR. WEST: Well, I think the process is important. 
11 If the rate of return is inadequate, than we do have to look 
2 at the process. I think if you get a high rate of return 
13 that's up with, that's better than average, nobody can really 
4 quibble with the process that was employed. However, if 
5 there is a decision made to get into, say, unconventional or 
16 investments that don't, that will not return a guaranteed 
7 rate, than the people who made this decision had better have 
8 done their homework. 
CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: So somewhere between the 
person putting their money into, puting the money into just a 
1 savings account at five percent and following just a very 
conservative process there, but a sure return to meet the 
five percent that the plan's goal might have been, to the 
other extreme of taking the money to Reno and getting a 100 
percent return, does the hundred percent return justify and 
make le timate the udent process that should have been 
followed or would he still be, or would the process say he 
28 was imprudent? 
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MR. W I think that in e setting at any 
rate, if you succeed~ the Department of Labor certainly and 
no an 
and bo 
r pan s, no an par cipant is going to come in 
er you about it as a practical matter. But it's o 
when you don't return that 100 percent by going to Las Vegas, 
you have wi d out the funds. Then somebody's going to be 
looking at your process. And because going to Las Vegas 
d res t in the destruction the fund, you should 
befor and have deliberated on this. 
Now, I mentioned that if, if reasonable men may 
differ over the investment, that even if the investment 
fails, nobody the Labor Department will not second-guess 
you. I emphasize that that's only if it's a matter over 
which reasonable investors may differ. it's something 
real 
ever 
to save 
ou. 
What 
wild and crazy that no reasonable investigator would 
t into, I don't think any amount of process is going 
at 
CH RMAN McCO UODALE: Okay. Very good. nk 
PAPAN: One question if I could ask. 
p in eve person has the 
22 responsi i of managing e system doesn't staff that 
syst adequate because the commission in the two systems 
th t 're nvolved in are just part-time commissions for the 
most part What ould be standard of operation then if 
in the event ose commissione s have been unable to 
27 prudent manag the resource because, say, the Le slature 
28 for exam e d dn' t ide fundi W had a year in which 
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1 this present Governor said we can't pay anybody more than 
2 62.5 as an arbitrary standard when the market place in the 
3 private segment was producing salaries and compensation for 
4 the best of talent much in excess of that. What --
5 MR. WEST: Here is another example where I think the 
6 ERISA model may not be applicable because the ERISA model is 
7 prudent expert and that means that you are sort of obliged to 
8 go out and hire these experts. Now, private sector employers 
9 cannot really use the excuse that they can't afford to go out 
10 and hire examiners. If they want to play in this game, they 
11 have to do it correctly. So this element, this is a 
12 distinguishing element. 
13 Obviously a public body that has these budgetary 
14 constraints that are real, I think that that is a distinction 
15 and should probably be addressed by a modification of the 
16 andards at least as a ied to public funds. 
17 ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Senator, thank you. 
18 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: All right. Very good, thank 
19 you. 
Our next witness is Ethan Lipsig with Paul, 
21 Hastings, Janofsky & Walker. 
MR. LIPSIG: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the 
Committee. My name is Ethan Lipsig. I'm a partner in the 
Los Angeles based law firm of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & 
Walker. 
Mr. West has ~lready covered a lot of the meat of my 
presentation, so I think I won't go through that. I'd like 
to begin by saying I share your frustrations in trying to 
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nd u t is a prudent investment. In fact, I 
reason for the frustration is that whol ude 
k the 
standard 
came about sa judicial review measure. It•s how a court 
would look with hindsight at what a trustee did when somebody 
was saying e trustee shouldn't have done that. And as 
such, the prudent man rule doesn't give you any guidance, it 
just helps you when they hold the trustee or the duciary 
liable. 
I ink based on some of the comments you've heard 
10 here, there are differences of opinion as to what objective 
11 the investment practices of public funds should follow. 
12 Should they, for example, be very conservative aimed at 
13 getting f xed rates of return which on a short-term basis 
14 seem to be appropriate or should they be structured to best 
15 maxi z e e 1 on g-term rate of return? People will differ as 
16 to the best way achieving these different objectives. 
17 
18 
The prudent man r e, person r e gives you no 
a e soever. I nk it may be appropriate for 
direction as to the goal to be achieved to be 
iven. In o er ords, you may say that we want our funds to 
21 be invested conservatively or you may say they can be 
nvested n whatever way is mo like to achieve the 
1 g- rm rate of return that w 1 be best. 
But I nk atever standard we use here, ere is 
25 a ssue in nd of how viable the standard is unless 
you c sider e 1 ia b i provi ons that go with it. ISA 
essentially says here is a standard which courts are to use 
28 in reviewing what you did, and if you vi ate that standard, 
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1 you're going to pay whatever loss occurs. You've got to pay 
2 that to the plan. The plan can't expurgate you, the plan 
3 can't indemni you and an can't buy you insurance. So 
4 the whole scheme here is to make the fiduciary personally 
5 liable to the plan for a loss. 
6 Now, in the public plan context when we're looking 
7 at essentially appointees, how are you going to get people to 
8 serve a $70 billion fund when if they make a mistake they 
9 could get sued? 
10 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Felons are, if they're felons, 
11 they're people not worried about prosecution. They would 
12 jump right up. 
13 MR. LIPSIG: Well, I assume those wouldn't be 
14 appointed. But you're going to appoint good people. 
15 ASSEMBLYMAN Well, we did one. We got one 
6 I is still loo ng for and he was the chairman. 
17 (Laughter.) 
18 MR. LIPSIG: But you won't use him again, will you? 
19 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: I don't know. With plastic 
surgery and a good resume I'm sure that some hapless governor 
2 in the future may wind up with this turkey again unless the 
I closes upon him. 
MR. LIPSIG: The pr em is you're not going to get 
peo e of good faith I think to serve if they're going to 
have unl ted liabili unless you protect them and once you 
start protecting them, the whole reason of the prudent person 
rule goes out the window because there is no longer any 
28 liability for violating itself. So I'm not sure --
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we want to 
year f 
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then if you 
SEMBL 
earn ten percent for 
and we aren't going 
unless it guarantees 
don't a chi eve that, 
isn't i ust smar er to say 
calendar year 1986 or f seal 
to par ci pate in any 
us that plus a kic r, and 
then you have some bas s for 
6 ly rapping the manager because they didn't achieve the 
7 goal. 
8 
9 
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11 
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• L Are you going to make them pay the 
shortf ? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: No, but I think you can replace 
them. mean, if you want to succeed in life, set low goals. 
If you real want to stretch people, we should be asking for 
13 14 percent a d see who steps up and says I' 11 handle that and 
14 if I a ieve it, I want a ki 
15 
16 
8 
19 
21 
22 
24 
MR. LI Two responses. It may be appropriate 
and you ay be ggesting e ght thing to do because I 
t n ; sta dard for determining when you're 
.; 
a e to e an works in e state context. I don't think 
t wor be a don t think you'll get public appointees 
serve unles ey're expurgated from the liability or 
erwi se pro tee d. But in response to your first question, 
am nvestment e rt, but I w 1 1 you that I 
nk ere are people far more qu ified than I. I 
th nk some e later speakers who w 1 tell you if your 
goal a ieve the st long-term yield, you don't set 
me e a looks to see how can I ma mize my yield 
for the next year. And I think that is a response. 
ELDER: Well, you can say our goal for 
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investment we buy in 1986- 1 87 will be that they'll be paying 
a current yield of 12 percent and we, for those that we seek 
ond that, investme we intend to hold for longer than one 
year, we would expect get substantially more than that or 
5 substantially less than that depending on what we think the 
6 market condition is. I mean, money is being lent at 21 
7 percent on master card despite a reduction in the prime 
8 rates. Somebody's writing that paper. 
9 MR. LIPSIG: And making a lot of money on it, too. 
10 point is that you've made a judgment on what you think 
11 the objective ought to be. 
12 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Current income. 
3 MR. LIPSIG: I'm not saying your formulation is 
14 incorrect. I just think there are other people that come up 
5 wi other form a ens. d I submit to you what this 
16 Committee ought to be doing is trying to help guide the 
1 public plans to determine what the correct goal is. Is the 
18 goal to establish a very conservative policy that looks 
towards maximization of income over a relatively short time 
frame because I think you can easily measure success or 
fa ure against that goal. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: That's right. 
MR. LIPSIG: Or is the goal to maximize long-term 
yield? I will tell you that I believe that in industry the 
goal generally speaking for funds which are long-term funds 
such as pension funds, is to maximize the yield long term and 
business cycles have a way of going up and down and all the 
statistics that I've seen have shown that if you look at long 
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1 cycles, say, 25-year rolling periods, there is not a 25-year 
2 rolling period in the last 25 years-- and don't quote me on 
3 this but I think this is correct -- where the stock market 
4 has not out performed the bond market, for example. And it's 
5 just a question of what kind of a cycle are you willing to 
6 get and what your goals are. 
7 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: I think your point about goal 
8 setting is extremely important and I think it's right on, but 
9 you obviously don't buy the same investment at various phases 
10 of the business cycle. I don't think, and I didn't mean to 
11 suggest that would be the case either. 
12 MR. LIPSIG: That is correct, and bonds are not 
13 necessarily any safer than stocks. As interest rates rise, 
14 the value of the bonds fall. You mentioned before while I 
15 was in the audience that why buy stocks if they appreciate in 
16 value, well, you can sell them and you can perhaps make more 
17 money than with fixed income securities and I would like also 
18 to point out that when you lend money to a financial 
19 institution, for example, by making some sort of deposit, 
20 that financial institution is borrowing the money because it 
21 thinks it can make more money on it than it has to pay you. 
22 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: But they're in that business. 
We're not. And the other thing is that we are the market. 
24 So if we sell, we collapse it. And that is a real 
25 constraint. It is not like the average investigator. We are 
26 kind of locked into buying. If we could unload our whole 
27 portfolio in one day, then it might make sense like an 
28 individual can. But we can't. If we did that, this country 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION (916) 362-2345 
1 would be in a 
here for 
pression and that certainly is not what we're 
• L IG: One 
n most banks, e mo ssets 
or llion I guess one of 
o ect es here 
bus ness t 
manage 
0 
e mo 
ds, 
se is at you have more 
countries. d with $70 
questions is is one of the 
in a way more like a 
capitalize on those 
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the appropriate g is ab ute security of principal and 
maximiz on cash returns under short time frame. 
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MR. LIPSIG: 
re do 1 t is that 
when the market is 
t you in the stock 
ing, then they' 
d 
ssed 
fie? 
1, the 
ls 
How specific do you think 
in setting those goal 
down to PERS or should the 
problem with having the 
have a way of changing. You 
ri ng, people say, well, gee, why 
market. But when the market is 
kic you for doing that. 
I don t know at it s a riate to have it fixed 
c e 1 le ati gh in the public plan 
context it may well be. I think there is a, you know, a big 
sue t I hear at ttee at least, as to whether 
the goal sh d be to maximize the returns over, say, a 
ear horizon 
short term in t 
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criticized for missing opportunities than you will for making 
mistakes, but I think you will make more money over the long 
term if you take some risks, and that's not to say you bet 
the whole portfolio in Reno. It may be appropriate to 
5 devote, say, one percent of the funds to venture capital type 
6 investments. 
7 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Who would be, if you had a 
8 contractor who was responding, who was answerable to a 
9 manager in, say, PERS who's answerable to the director, 
10 executive director, who's answerable to the Board, and the 
11 contractor is not prudent in his operation, where does the 
12 liability stop? Would it be the contractor, the manager? 
13 MR. LIPSIG: Let me make a caveat that my personal 
14 experience is almost exclusively in the private sector and 
15 I'm not very familiar with state law, but in preparing for 
16 this hearing I did review I hope all the relevant provisions 
17 of state law. I'm sure I missed many of them. But with 
18 those caveats in mind, it is unclear to me what standard of 
19 care state law would impose on, for example, an investment 
20 manager hired to manage a portfolio. I think that is one of 
21 the deficiencies in the current legislation. 
22 It may w be appropriate to say that an investment 
23 manager essentially is going to be liable to the plan for 
24 breaches of fiduciary duty determined very much and akin with 
25 ERISA standards because the liability in that case really 
26 will benefit the plan because the state won't have to 
27 indemnify that professional. The professional normally 
28 s taking that risk. 
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n other hand to say t the people above him 
at the governmental end d bear any personal liabili I 
thi k w 1 no work ess their action are reckless or 
w 1 In fact, I th nk i d be helpf to cl 
that state officials w 1 not be lia e for breaches of 
cia duties un ey 1 re w 1 , reckless or 
i n onal cause I t esent standard, if 
there is 1 ia li a st breaches of fiduciary 
, nond iberate brea s just doesn't work. But I do 
at a more ri ous standard should be imposed on 
e d ing with the fund on a ofessional basis because 
ey're used to it un 
CHAIRMAN McCORQ 
and it w 1 benefit the fund. 
All right. Any other 
questions? Very d 1, thank you for your comments. 
chard Gilbert of the law firm Our next wi tne 
rrick, Herri n and Sut iffe. 
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There is a great degree of uncertainty in my mind, 
and I have spent a f r amount of time with this legislation, 
especial as it applies to county retirement plans under the 
37 Act and local pension plans of districts and cities, a 
primary example. There is a lot of unclarity as to whether 
the language, the prudence standard applies only in the area 
of investment management or as well as to the administration 
of the plan, the provision of the benefits and the 
administration of the nuts and bolts of the plan. This has 
the people who are out there administering the plans as well 
as being responsible for the investment of the monies worried 
and confused. 
I think for what it's worth that there was no 
intention in the minds of the Legislature or the people of 
the state in passing Prop 21 to go beyond the investment 
area. It all speaks in that area. But some of the 
legislation that was adopted in the wake of 21 does speak 
very There is no need to cover in my mind 
administrative decisions, benefit decisions, because there's 
a fairly coherent body of law in the State of California on 
the appeal of agency decisions as they relate to personal 
benefits or as to o er matters. 
Civ Code Section 2261 was the product of a major 
effort by various committees of the Legislature to elect in 
1982 a standard of prudence for the trustees of general 
trusts, banks, individuals. ghty-two passed two years 
before Prop 21. It is not clear in the law as to whether 
that standard whi was developed with an eye view of 
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3 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
1 
1 
te ry a e- d con ict between the current 
income benefi ary son s going to take the 
e n e income iary s dead is 1 my mind 
ina to a to the governance of the investments 
of a very ere p e e, c pen on ans. A and 
Con ess ess when ER wa ssed iberately enacted 
a rd de rted and ins ucted the courts to 
have an eye toward w t' d under your common 1 aw trusts, 
but part of wh e nt A was to establish a new 
standard, one whi was very ose followed in the drafting 
of 2 and e 1m ementing le a on. But there are a 
number attorneys w a 1, we have to look at 
as w 1. d, a e don't , aren't even 
sure what a s. 
na ing does de ne o is 
ect to e du nee. is? In ER terms 
s q ite sim h a d ni on of c ary. That 
definition is not sim e at 1 ts outer edges, but we can go 
throu a group peo e r a ng to a an and sort of 
identi a B are fiducia es, C and D are not a w 
knows 
1 s ar to ese ndards n 
and n the at the 1 a on s set up, 
there is no defi tion of fiduciary. I believe this could be 
? s su ect to the duties tial and n an area that 
has bee touched on E primarily but also David and 
others i t rn 1 ter to ay Pm s e s the almost total 
exce w respect to the slat on governing the 
R 16 5 
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1 STRS, the teachers' plan, the almost total absence of a 
2 method or procedure for the formal delegation of not only the 
3 responsibility but, the authority but the responsibility and 
4 potential liability for investing public fund assets. There 
5 is no procedure. In ERISA, again, there is statutory 
6 provisions as well as fairly standard coherent case law and 
7 administrative body of law that shows us how to effectively 
8 delegate responsibility to a professional outside manager. 
9 How to make that person liable for his or her or its actions 
10 and to make the appointing authority responsible for the 
11 imprudence of the selection. 
12 The implementing legislation, I think is fairly 
13 characterized as just having been layered upon the existing 
14 framework with varying degrees of attention. At least as, 
15 speaking as one who is not involved in the process and is 
16 reading what resulted from the effort of the last, of a 
17 couple of years ago, the four statutory patterns are 
18 inconsistent. The Education Code has indeed enacted a, what 
19 we call in the trade a prohibitive transaction set of 
20 principles, something at the basis of ERISA's fiduciary 
21 standards but not found in the other three statutes or 
22 enactments. 
23 In some respects perhaps there is a basis for 
24 distinguishing between the standards to be applied to the 
25 management of the water district in X, Y, Z county which the 
26 an covering 20 people or something in PERS, sure. But for 
27 the mo part the standards could be the same and probably it 
28 should be. 
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It 1 s very unclear to what degree the people 1 n 
2 enacting and the Legislature in enacting the enabling 
3 legisla on intended to make the people who run the pension 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
plans, make the inv 
sonally 1 ia e. 
members of the Boa 
ci ons, to operate it, to be 
ba s in advising fiduciaries, 
as to whether they're liable for their 
errors in j gment or out t intentional act is not ear. 
It s a ing a square peg in a round hole sort of situation 
9 to try to find your way as to how possibly the public 
10 liability act known as the tort claims act may apply in this 
11 tuation. 
2 na ople are one of the reasons I think 
th t and I nk it's ue and maybe the rest of your 
4 testimony today will reveal that some, there are varying 
lev s com iance raw reness of 21. PERSis at one 
e reme, I thi it s very aware, at one extreme of this 
equa on but at water st ct in X, Y, Z county may not 
e sli test idea w t e Legislature has done. 
I nk there's an absence of a means of educating 
and keepi inform the pe e who run the pension plans and 
na ng em to seek bo investment and legal counsel with 
re ct to their actions and e consequences of them. There 
is arying degree ertainty among the various boards as to 
whether they have authori 
to be compensated. 
That concludes my 
to hire experts and how they are 
1-prepared remarks, and I will 
be happy to entertain any questions. 
CHAIRMAN Me E: You touched on one item 
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1 there that e asked rlier about, where in the line the 
2 udent rso may show up, and Assem man Papan ea ier 
3 on the issue of adequate sta or leav ng positions vacan . 
4 Then you indicate that we don't have a definition of what 
5 fiduciary is. Maybe if we, it may be interesting to get that 
6 defined as the Governor and the Legislature would find out 
1 all at once we do have money to fill the positions and 
8 adequate pay for the e. What would happen in the 
9 private sector a president of the company had a company 
10 managed retirement system and failed to appoint adequate 
11 staff for the a and some money was invested, some monies 
12 didn't t investe , some payment env opes were opened and 
13 some weren't deposited? What would happen in that case? Who 
14 would be responsi 
15 MR. GILBERT: If it were the president, using your 
16 e am e, if it were the president that indeed had e 
17 respo lity wi respect to the plan to appoint people to 
18 manage the n and had not carried out that authority, he 
1 e lia li em in my nd, yes. We, what a 
2 
d de of the act i es of the likes of David and Ethan 
d I wi res ct to the vate lev , private pension 
a s is to advise private oyers as to an effective means 
ating fidu iary re nsibility for who has the 
a thori ppoint the peo e who either manage or 
admi an or invest its assets. Who has the 
re pon review? 
But that mechanism is not 
How w 1 t review be conducted? 
esent in the California law as I 
28 can see. 
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1 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: If you look at the issue of 
2 prudent and that that could extend the payment of benefits, 
3 you probably aren't fam iar with the various state 
4 retirements, but the Judges' Retirement System is an example. 
5 It's under funded and doesn't have enough money to pay its 
6 benefits each year, has to have money appropriated for it. 
7 If the Legislature increases the benefits or allows benefits 
8 to continue without adequate money to pay for them, is that 
9 a, would that be a possibility of an imprudent act? Would a 
10 taxpayer have the right to sue over that or interject 
1 themselves on that basis? 
12 MR. GILBERT: I would think it imprudent in the 
13 nonlegislative sense if you will. There is a duck. I don't 
14 think it's imprudence within the framework of the statute. I 
15 have not seen the statute, the enabling statute governing the 
16 j s' plan if, indeed, such legislation-- analyze to 
figure out which statute, but assume that the one governing 
18 county plans applied, I wouldn't think it imprudent in those 
19 terms, but something should be done perhaps. 
CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Well, what happens if the 
gislature allows the plan to continue but didn't 
appropriate money and someone didn't get their retirement? 
Wouldn't that be an 1m ent thing to allow to happen? 
MR. GILBERT: Again, I think it would be imprudent 
in a general sense, but I'm not at all sure if they include 
it within the meaning of the legislation or the Constitution. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Nothing to invest. Is that the 
problem? Nothing was invested? 
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MR. GI It approaches the problem is there 
are assets there. Now at you've got the money in trust if 
you 1, or in the account, now we'll look at it. ER A 
4 approaches it pret much the same way. 
5 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: There are no assets in the 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
, 1 
12 
13 
14 
1 
16 
17 
8 
19 
20 
21 
judici retirement system. 
MR. GILBERT: Then it would be imprudent to hire 
anyone to mana it 
( ughter.) 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Sounds like a good idea. 
CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: How would you balance the 
constitutional requirement? How would you balance the 
statement "to minimize the employer contributions with the 
du to act in the best interests of the beneficiary"? 
MR. GILBERT: I think I've given, that's a tough one 
and rsonal approach is that it is obvious where 21 came 
and i e om ER s dards and by the time it was 
enacte we a volumes of case law under ERISA in the ten 
years. 
sta 
ere was some refined meaning as to what those 
meant. California's people added to that standard 
minimizing employer contributions. That has to mean 
ethi And it w l, I think, I can't be more definite. 
I thi k ere real meaning to it and it may-- I don't 
nk you can a roach it sayi , well, prudence would be a 
ten percent eturn and that factor adds a nt and a half to 
the etur. unfortuna isn't analyzed that way. I 
don't h e much more to 
ink at it w 1 justi 
er than it means something and I 
a degree of different behavior on 
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1 the part of public fund operators. 
2 One point, perhaps a footnote, is that there are a 
3 number, especially cities in this state, that have their own 
4 independent plans, 401 (k) plans are known or similar defined 
5 contribution plans. No pension is promised in terms of a 
6 formula at age 65 or whatever, but rather we will put in "X" 
7 percent of your compensation it says. Such a plan would 
8 minimize the employer contributions. It obviously was 
9 written in terms of what we call pension plans. 
10 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: A similar issue which seems 
11 to me that you technically would be only one minor, one mid 
12 point that you could possibly reach would be to minimize the 
13 risk of loss and maximize the rate of return. Those just 
14 don't seem to-- I guess there is a figure that you pick each 
15 year that happens to be for 10.2, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 
16 percent of return, if that's a precise point. But is that, 
17 the fineness of something like that, does that really matter 
18 or is that simply sort of a policy statement that's not--
19 MR. GILBERT: I don't think in the real world it 
matters. I don't think it's going to change people's --
1 those are too fine a nuance to really govern the behavior I 
think of the employer, of the retirement boards of the state 
that are running these plans. 
24 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: All right. 
MR. FELDERSTEIN: The last point of your 
presentation you mentioned that some of the pension funds 
27 were having trouble obtaining expert legal advice? 
MR. GILBERT: I think it is there to be offered for 
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s e, i ou w 
MR 
3 
MR. 
, bu author! 
a 
Yeah there is 
to 
i to obtain --
RSTEIN: c d you relate some of e 
5 situa ons that have occurred that you 1 ve personally been 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1 nvolved in? 
MR. G Only anecdotally, you know, second and 
rd hand. But that's so much more fun than if not 
relia e. re is a provision that says -- I'm spea ng of 
the coun 37 Act there is a provision that says that the 
county counsel is the counsel to the Board. There is 
Ian ge permits county, the Board to en ge an 
attorney in ate practice using attorney as an example. I 
nk the authori to hire, I digressed, to hire investment 
counsel is 
i es 
earer because it's more clearly associated with 
t. 
coun counsel's I think interpreting that 
n d er nt manner. It's not very clear. It was 
roa d i con unction with the enabling 1 slation of 
20 op 21 It is di erent after 3508 was enacted than it was 
22 
8 
b for t eans something. one other point. 
ovisions in the coun 
r 
act 
a 
i 
ause n ne of the other 
permits e enga ent of a torneys in 
o nection wi investments of the funds. 
v ate practice 
Now, does that 
mean at n they decide to buy assets of mortgages 
can come i and h p w te the documentation or does 
t mean that I can p to advise the Board in is sort of 
tua on as t at a , what 21 needs -- do you see --
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1 and that there are diverging views on. 
2 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Are you aware of any 
iti tion ag nst ic fund trustees? 
4 MR. GILBERT: Not yet. My response would have been 
5 about the same very shortly after ERISA was enacted. To give 
6 you an idea, if I may, an anecdote, in the 11 years since 
7 ERISA was enacted, we are now about filled with six volumes 
8 of the case reporter. About five years after ERISA I think 
9 we were in the first volume. We have this kind of growth. I 
10 don't, I think it will be smaller than that obviously in the 
11 State of California, but I think it's a question of education 
12 of the county and its bar. It's expensive to bring the first 
13 case. It becomes less so as the path to the courthouse 
14 becomes more worn. 
15 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: I guess to give some 
16 sleepless nights to some public managers, are you aware of 
17 any that should have been litigated? 
18 MR. GILBERT: I best not comment on that. 
19 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Okay. Any other questions? 
Very good. Thank you. 
21 Our next witness is Richard Yankee from San 
22 Bernardino County Employees' Retirement Association. 
MR. YANKEE: Good afternoon. I'm Dick Yankee from 
San Bernardino County. 
Before Proposition 21 which I might add that I was 
26 one of the supporters ~f, the San Bernardino County 
Retirement System had about $425 million and the asset mix 
28 was about 50 percent in bonds and mortgages, a little under 
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1 per nt in sto k, 
2 on the 1 1 list. 
3 
4 
In our stock return in 1984, about one pe cent ra 
return for the en re year. n, again, the S & P 500 
5 index only returned about 6.6 percent. 
6 had a ut 10 percent of our assets in real estate 
1 and the rest in cash. For a public pension fund we feel we 
8 
9 
d etty 
12 percent for 
d in 19 r rate of return was ght around 
e entire fund. So that was the status 
10 before Prop 21. 
11 After Proposition 21 passed, the first thing we did 
12 was to expand the role of our funds evaluator. Rather than 
13 just ing us how well we were doing in performance in 
14 comparison to other funds, we now needed to know how our 
15 
16 
7 
18 
19 
2 
assets sh d be allocated and invested in this wide world of 
i es nt at d now just been made ava able to us. If 
you ook at a the investment opportuni es that seem to be 
av t is our nion t we better some 
p ess on a advice to p sort things out. you can go 
n your own, I nk you're going to re ly head for trouble. 
did at and believe if we had not, we would not 
hav ent r would have been im dent. The next 
did afte get ng our cons tant on board, we hired 
a custodia bank for our securities, as the custodian of 
25 our securi es because we considered it no longer to be 
e a h e less of e state-of-the-art capa lities 
wh n it came to processing and safekeeping securities 
relat ng to th va ious investment vehicles now available to 
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1 us. 
2 Our investm objective changed from doing the best 
3 we can under the law to be prudent by hiring experts, 
4 diversifying, and always get the very best return we can out 
5 of any given investment. 
6 The next move was to rearrange how our assets were 
7 allocated. With the help of our consultant who had now taken 
8 on that expanded role, our Board decided that 35 percent of 
9 our assets, which are now at over 525 million, 35 percent of 
10 our assets should be in bonds and mortgages, another 35 
1 percent in common stock and the remaining 30 percent in what 
12 are called nontraditional investments which include real 
13 estate, venture capital, and international. 
14 We have committed about 15 million for international 
15 and we also have about 17 and a half in venture capital and 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
24 
28 
we have about 14 rcent of our assets, so I guess that's 
around $40 million committed to real estate or in real 
estate. 
To accomplish our new investment objectives we hired 
four new managers in 1985, but we also terminated four 
managers. 
Presently, we have 12 
e money managers on our team. 
Our 1985 rate of return for the entire fund was 18.1 
We don't keep any 
We don't have 
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18.1 perce t. 
EMB ELDER: Mr Ch rman. 
AIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Mr. der. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: 18.1 percent is the cash you got 
on your investments? 
6 MR. YANKEE: No 1 sir. That's the rate of return on 
7 the investments. 
8 
9 
10 
1 
12 
13 
1 
15 
16 
17 
8 
19 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: So you 
in dividends or interest? 
dn't get 18 1 percent 
MR. YANKEE: We did not have actual money that 
equaled 18 percent come into the fund, but that's not how you 
count your successes in investment. You count your success 
in investing by val e from starting value and ending value. 
ASSEMB ELDER: So you're talking stock 
appreciation as part of the 18.1 percent? 
0 a r 
MR 
ASSEMB 
Absolutely. Yes, sir. 
YMAN ELDER: What would it be absent the 
? you have any idea? 
E: I don't know the answer to that. 
ELDER: But you didn't sell, so it's 
21 kind of 
22 • YANKEE: We did substantial part of it. 
ELD You d some of it. Trading 
r its are in there? 
25 MR. That's correct. Actually we had an 
index fund that you were referring to earlier, is about 500 
index funds and we took the profits on that -- actually, 
28 let's see, the fund was about 
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! profits on everything that had increased 15 percent or more 
during the year. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: So you didn't collect? 
MR. YANKEE: I'm trying to point out one example. 
5 No, we did not collect. 
6 
7 percent? 
8 
9 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: You did not collect 18.1 
MR. YANKEE: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: You collected something less 
10 than that. You don't know what it was exactly? 
11 MR. YANKEE: That's correct. I do not know. That 
12 is not a meaningful number to us. 
13 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: So that the amount of cash you 
14 got in dividends or interest is not a meaningful number to 
15 you? 
16 
17 
18 
MR. YANKEE: The dollars 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: That seems imprudent to me. 
MR. YANKEE: The dollars are important to us. When 
19 we gauge the performance, the investment performance, there's 
only one way that we can do so which is at the beginning 
21 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: There is not one way to do 
anything. 
MR. YANKEE: It's the only way we can do it and 
24 compare ourselves with the rest of the investment world. 
25 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: That's like comparing yourself 
26 to, never mind, it's 1 i.ke comparing a typhoon to a monsoon, 
27 they're both disasters, but moving right along here. You 
28 mentioned that real estate was a nontraditional investment. 
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definition. 
Real estate is a nontradi onal 
n re estate are not nontraditional? 
ij That's correct. 
5 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: So it's the actual ownership of 
6 the property that is nontraditional. 
7 MR. YANKEE: It's only nontraditional for asset 
8 allocation pur ses. To say that it is not an acceptable 
9 form of investment would not be accurate. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
9 
20 
21 
24 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Thank you. 
MR. YANKEE: In 1985 there is no way you could 
actually accurately gauge what our reallocation of assets 
resulted in, but because we move all kinds of different, 
moved in d erent types of investments, but I think, and I 
have a very 
percent for 
te mill on 
I 
ong feeling that that number is around two 
e year or in appreciation in value of nine or 
lars for our fund alone. 
elieve that through the passage of Proposition 21 
the peo e e State of California have charged us, the 
tru es and admi strators of more than the $73 billion in 
assets wi e duty to be prudent in getting a good return 
on our inves 
em oyer. 
t and to help reduce the pension costs of the 
task 
To accom ish this task, and really it's an awesome 
cause $73 b lion becomes a $100 billion dollars in 
just a co e of yea s down the road. It's an awful lot of 
money a d I think we need some help from the Legislature. I 
think the L slature needs to look at the current statutes 
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1 to insure that county retirement boards, and we're different 
2 than the state retirement boards, county retirement boards 
3 have the authority and the ability to fulfill their increased 
4 fiduciary responsibilities. 
5 For a pension fund, I don't believe it is possible 
6 to continue the traditional relationship governments have 
7 with their employers. A substantial part of the pension 
8 business is to make money which is a major departure from 
9 government's more traditional role of providing services. 
10 Money management is a very dynamic business and changes quite 
11 rapidly, and changes sometimes create tremendous 
12 opportunities to make money. We need to learn how to take 
13 better advantage of the opportunities that come along and the 
14 one possible way in my view to do this is to have our 
15 government employees who are involved in the investment 
16 process to become profit motivated. And I'm not sure this is 
17 possible in the traditional government work environment. 
18 By way of example, the importance of this, if one 
19 million dollars comes into the, into the till on Friday or in 
20 the form of a check on Friday and some clerk or somebody 
21 decides that they're just not going to bother with depositing 
22 that over the weekend, the loss of income just by being in a 
23 simple account, maybe through the Treasurer's Office, the 
24 loss of it is $500 just for that one weekend. If we multiply 
25 that kind of loss which I believe occurs throughout the 
26 state, if we multiply ~hat, we have a tremendous amount of 
27 money that is really being lost or not being properly taken 
28 care of by the people who are in charge of that 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION (916) 362-2345 
1 
2 there's any way to a lutely det rmine w ther or not a 
3 retirement sy em is doing what they're supposed to be doing 
4 except by the results at the end of the year. But these 
5 small dollars fall through the cracks every day. 
6 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: One of the previous 
7 witnesses stated the current state law is deficient in that 
8 it doesn't contain penalties for fund managers who violate 
9 the prudent son rule. What's your reaction to that? 
10 MR. YANKEE: I would agree that perhaps there is 
11 some better enforcement rules that are necessary or a way to 
12 gauge whether or not they're doing their job. If they're 
13 not, there's some way through the court system that we can do 
1 something about holding them responsible for their 
15 imprudence. necessary, make the fund whole. 
16 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: So sort of in line with what 
17 you're saying about the-- I suppose if you could not open 
18 and inv e money over the weekend, you might do it for a 
9 week or you might do it maybe two weeks or I think the state 
20 one time was, what, a month behind in opening payments from 
21 the Franchise x Board. So I suppose that's what you're 
22 talking about is creating e urgency of dealing with the 
issues in eatest return? 
MR. YANKEE: Yes, sir, that's exactly what I'm 
25 de ing with or what I'm referring to. I think if we work 
rd eery in ying to make our money work for us we're 
going to have fairly nice returns on our investments. But if 
we turn our back on it even for a minu e, we'll lose money. 
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1 We lose more money by ignoring something in this business 
2 than we would by having increased staff just to make sure the 
3 job got done. 
4 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: How does, how do you get 
5 your retirement board? Where do they come from? Are they 
6 elected by members or appointed by the Board of Supervisors? 
7 MR. YANKEE: We have four appointed by the Board of 
8 Supervisors, four are elected by the employees and the 
9 retired member and we have a county treasurer as an ex 
10 officio member and nine member boards. That's true of all 
11 the 1937 Act counties. 
12 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: How do they view the issue 
13 of prudent man, prudent person rule. Is that, do they 
14 discuss it a lot? Are they aware of it? Is it an issue? 
15 MR. YANKEE: It's a very major issue with them. We 
16 had a meeting last Thursday, for example, and two of our 
17 Board members almost made speeches over the idea of here they 
18 were being held responsible under the Constitution for doing 
19 things and yet they have difficulty in being able to carry 
20 out that responsibility in all cases. And part of that is, 
21 for example, in the county systems, the county retirement 
22 systems have been held by the courts and our legal folks have 
23 the same opinion, have held to be separate public entities, 
24 in other words, we are not a part of the county government 
25 per se. We're independent of that. But yet myself and my 
26 staff are county employees. So, as a county employee, if the 
27 county so wished to they could assert their responsibility 
28 that they can for example determine the salaries of these 
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em oyees, can etermine the ace they perform their 
services and yet e R irement Board s ng h d 
accountable for what their staff is doing. So somebo is, 
somebody in effect is relieving the Board of Retirement of 
part of their responsibilities. 
CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Questions? Very good. 
Thank you. Appreciate your comments. 
Our next witness is Sid McCausland, Public 
Employees' Retirement System. 
(Thereupon a brief recess was taken.) 
MR. McCAUSLAND: Mr. Chairman, Assemblyman Elder, 
it's a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss a topic 
that's critical to all of us charged by Proposition 21 with 
the a ori , responsibility, liability and burdens of a 
ducia am d McCausland, Executive Officer of PERS. 
PERS ieves that the prudent expert provision of 
Proposi n 1 require us to att n a higher standard of 
i nee than is required by the former prudent person 
standard. As one of the draftsman and supporters of 
Proposi on 21, I w come the challenges but I also recognize 
demand the Cons tution now places on my Board of 
istrat on, my staff and me. 
ther presentations on today's agenda have 
24 h ghli t e fiduciary impact of Proposition 21. 
erefore my brief presenta on will focus on the steps that 
PE S has take meet the new allenges of fiduciary 
conduct. The materi s in binder will give you a 
28 compr ns e overview of the major ements in PERS' ongoing 
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1 effort to strengthen our management of the Public Employees' 
2 Retirement Fund. 
3 The real test of a good fiduciary is nearly 
4 identical to the test of a good manager. PERS has peen 
5 following the evolution of the prudent expert standards since 
6 the passage of the Federal Employee Retirement Income 
7 Security Act, ERISA, in 1974. Even though ERISA only applies 
8 to private pension plans, it was becoming increasing probable 
9 that ERISA case law would ultimately be applicable to public 
10 retirement systems. 
11 Consequently PERS employed the services of Ian 
12 Lanoff as fiduciary counsel in December 1983. Mr. Lanoff had 
13 served as the first administrator of the ERISA program and 
14 had championed in several of the court cases which defined 
15 the standards of due diligence and prudent conduct which 
16 Proposition 21 extended to PERS. 
17 Mr. Lanoff prepared two opinions for PERS which are 
18 at Tab B in the binder. Many of the points made in the 
19 opinions have been covered in today's testimony, so I will 
20 skip over the opinions at this time. Nevertheless, I 
21 encourage you to read them because they give you some 
22 appreciation of the kinds of issues that cause me to awaken 
23 in the dark of night to reassure myself that we are covering 
24 all the bases. 
PERS also retained the services of the Wilshire 
26 Associates in April 1984. Wilshire Associates provides 
27 consulting services to a broad spectrum of retirement 
28 systems. Their range of services includes helping the system 
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determine i s f din needs, appropriate inv stment 
alternatives for meet ng th se fundi g needs, asset 
a oca on tar ts investment policy and o ectives, 
investm strate , investment plans, manager selection, 
performance manito ng and evaluation of why performance is 
the way it is, and ongoing consulting services. 
PERS s used most of the range of services 
available from W shire. Tabs c, D, and G in the binder 
contain some of Wilshire's most important reports toPERS. 
The voluminous collection of Wilshire materials in our files 
is available for review by your staff and will be provided to 
you if you f the need. 
The material in the binder, however, provides a 
comprehensive overview of the issues which PERS has 
addressed. Sine ou ve already heard testimony on most of 
the steps in def ning a sound investment process, I'll only 
to on most critical aspects of the process. 
f duciary is charged with the duty of insuring 
a a comprehen e, ratio and reputable process is 
tilized in e management of the retirement program. The 
ba c steps that has utilized are probably applicable to 
all ret ent systems. PERS has sou t to answer the 
f owing ques ons and in as disciplined a manner as 
po s e What is our fiduciary duty? What are PERS funding 
needs? at risks are associated wi r urns on various 
i estment v icles? How much risk should PERS acce in its 
27 efforts to maximize returns? How should PERS allocate its 
assets to meet its funding needs? Wha investment policies 
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1 and objectives will best serve PERS funding needs? How 
2 should PERS implement its investment policies and objectives? 
3 What investing activities should be performed by PERS staff 
4 or external managers? What qualifications should be required 
5 of the internal staff? What qualifications should be 
6 required of the external managers? How much should we be 
7 willing to pay for investment services? What performance 
8 expectations do we have for both the internal and external 
9 managers? How should we monitor performance? How can we 
10 protect the funds against inappropriate actions? Where can 
11 we go for unbiased oversight of our operations and how can we 
12 improve the trustees' and administrators' understanding of 
13 fiduciary issues? And finally, how can we strengthen and 
14 improve the legal framework within which we operate? 
15 The binder is filled with pieces of the answers to 
16 each of these questions, but the potential list of subsidiary 
17 questions is nearly infinite. Therefore, this process is 
18 ongoing and subject to continuous review and refinement. We 
19 believe that PERS has established a sound program of 
20 policies, procedures, delegations and internal controls which 
21 will allow us to meet the Proposition 21 challenge. 
22 At this point, Mr. Chairman, rather than read you 
23 the entire binder, I'd be happy to respond to the Committee's 
24 questions about PERS implementation of the prudent expert 
25 rule. I believe that the materials will be broad enough in 
26 scope to point out our .response, official response in most of 
27 the areas, and if I don't have the answers with me I can get 
28 them to you just as soon as possible. 
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CHAIRMAN Me RQ E: Under H you hav e 
memo to e Board r ated to fi ciary insurance. We heard, 
one of the attorneys said that he didn't ink, that e 
liability would not reach an individual and it wasn't able to 
haps identify along that line. Is that a prudent 
expenditure money to spend a million dollars for fiduciary 
8 insurance if the person is charged by law with being prudent 
9 in their operation? If they don't meet that, then they're 
10 not following the law and should you have insurance to cover 
11 a person who is not following e law? 
12 MR. McCAUSLAND: The answer to the question, is the 
13 million dollar fee imprudent, is the question that I'm st 
14 mulling over and caused me to write this particular 
15 memorandum ch s to my Board of Administration next 
16 
1 
18 
9 
21 
week. 
de t wi 
bel eve that the insurance industry has not yet 
the ques on of fiduciary insurance for public 
ctor funds and that the premiums are not an accurate 
eflection the risk. I don't b ieve that over the long 
term a lion lars a year in premium expense would 
t f a e. However, we're not as convinced as the ea ier 
spe ker that e courts won t find a way to reach individual 
u s and individu a members on issues of this 
regard a in fact that it would be imprudent to use the 
funds the ic ployees' Retirement Fund to pay for any 
court deci ons at might come down. 
8 So at the present time we are paying for five 
PETERS 0 AN REPORTING CORPORATION (916) 362 
58 
1 million dollars in coverage. The premium and deductible are 
2 unconscionable and consequently we're proposing the work of 
3 the State Teachers' Retirement System to look at alternative 
4 ways of providing this coverage for our trustees. 
5 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Mr. Chairman. 
6 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Mr. Elder. 
7 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Why don't you insure each other? 
8 That's a hell of a return. If you invested, you get, for a 
9 million dollars, pay the premium to each other, and your 
10 exposure is rather minimal. 
11 MR. McCAUSLAND: Thank you very much. The proposal 
12 in fact is that we develop a mutual insurance pact 
13 conceivably with the other public pension funds in the state 
14 and essentially do what local government is beginning to do, 
15 organize insurance pools. 
16 We don't believe that trust law would allow us to 
17 self insure. We don't think we can use the trust fund to 
18 protect trustees from mismanagement, but we do believe that 
19 insurance pool of a number of trust funds could be utilized 
20 in the manner that you're proposing. And that is--
21 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: A million dollars for $4 million 
22 worth of insurance. 
23 MR. McCAUSLAND: We can fully capitalize an 
24 insurance company with our premiums. 
25 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: That's a 25 percent rate of 
26 return. In four years JOU 1 ve got, I mean you could by a 
27 MR. McCAUSLAND: This one happens to be a 20 percent 
28 rate which surveys very attractive. I would buy into that 
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company 
to do 
goal is 
before I 
mysel an we may just get a op 
ASSEMB that's 
That's in cash, make 20 percent 
at least 12. You made 11 by your 
asked the question. u made 18 
MR. McCAUSLAND: We made 29 in 
to t 
th thing you need 
cash which is my 
opening statement 
on your 
tal time weighted 
7 rates of return according to the form a we have to report to 
8 the Legi ature on, but we cr ted 11, we have roughly 11 to 
9 credit the accounts which is the number you were looking for. 
10 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: 11 of the 29 is cash, is that 
11 what you meant, leaving 18, which is what I said? 
1 
13 
MR. Me AND: Now I know how that works. 
CHA MAN McCORQUODALE: Your annual report indicates 
14 you have assets of 28 billion in this market. 
15 • Me AND: As of June 30th, that's true. It's 
16 in excess of 33 b lion today. 
1 
19 
20 
CORQUODALE: Do you have a full-time 
fiduc ary coun e ? 
MR. McCA AND: No. We have a relationship with 
n La on ret ner where opinions are forwarded to him 
21 on the Board and staff's request. We also have individual 
etainers with a securities law specialist and a real estate 
law speci ist, but we do not retain full-time RS dedicated 
24 fiduc ary counsels. 
CHAIR Me UODALE: Are you looking at the 
sib i Departme coun ? 
MR. Me We have an internal staff with 
28 sse al seven author ed 1 egal po ons® However, the 
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1 expertise required for the tracking of fiduciary law has not 
2 been one that we have been able to internally prepare 
3 ourselves for. Our specialty in the past has been the 
~ benefit administration side of this package. We don't have 
5 internal staff counsel with strong investment background. So 
6 we have not attempted to bring that expertise in-house yet. 
7 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: After hearing the first 
8 three witnesses, I would think that the prudent course is to 
9 insure that you have adequate legal counsel. 
10 MR. McCAUSLAND: I think that there's absolutely no 
11 question about that, but I think one of the things that they 
12 said over and over again was that the ultimate test is did 
13 you use a process and did you gather the right kinds of 
1~ information that you can demonstrate in a court of law that 
15 that's the way people with expertise in this area would have 
16 handled that decision and then if it turns out it wasn't the 
17 best of all possible decisions but you used the right 
18 sequence of events and the right kinds of analytical skills 
19 and the right expertise to make your decision, you are all 
20 right. 
21 So our emphasis has been on the development of 
22 procedures, internal controls, explicit adopted Board 
23 policies that make it clear what it is legal and not legal to 
2~ do as a staff person or an outside manager, and we're relying 
25 on the fact that you should have a body of evidence available 
26 to you to defend your actions. 
27 One of the issues that you're raising is the State 
28 Teachers in fact does have fiduciary counsel present with 
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em, as I understand 1 t, at ea of eir Board and 
Investment i tee meetings. We have 
extent at P nor do I believe that 
California plans. 
CHAIR HAN McCORQUODALE: Looking 
commented on earlier from the Board down 
contract person, who would you consider 
t process? 
not gone to at 
t's ty cal of other 
at that list that I 
through to a 
be fiduciaries in 
• McCA AND: Everyone is a fiduciary in the 
10 process that you define from the Board through me to my staff 
11 to external manager. Each of us is a fiduciary. There's no 
12 way we can escape being a fiduciary. We believe that 
13 ultima the court would look to how effectively we 
14 d egated responsibility. For instance, there's no doubt in 
15 
16 
17 
19 
20 
2 
24 
2 
my mind 
duties r 
at Board has delega to me a specific set of 
a specific list of types of investments. 
A f I am w king within that list of types of investments, 
a ccordi to th r criteria, that the buck would stop at me 
nd proba not flow back to them. 
mana 
Likewise, if we had a contract with an outside 
n which we explicitly delegated to the outside 
manager f 1 iscretion for the management of the account and 
we never inte ered in the management of the account, we 
b ieve t y u can effect ely tran er authority to that 
ou side mana r. I ink e em in the public 
se tor s we seldom delegate f total unmitigated 
d i so reti on. We frequently want to touch bases on individual 
1 e tme ts nd things and n that nt I believe you 
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1 probably cloud the effectiveness of your delegation. 
2 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Do you think everybody in 
3 your agency knows? If you walked up to someone and asked 
4 them if they were fiduciaries or not, would they know? Is 
5 that clear? Is it a matter of discussion and training within 
6 the management? 
7 MR. McCAUSLAND: I really appreciate that opener, 
8 Senator. The answer to that is that PERS, the managers that 
9 are fiduciaries know they are fiduciaries because they have 
10 been offered an opportunity to purchase insurance for 
11 themselves. They have to pay for it out of their own pocket, 
12 but if you have any discretionary authority at PERS, you have 
13 been offered an opportunity to participate in an insurance 
14 program that is available to fiduciaries to protect them 
15 essentially from nuisance suits. It does not protect anybody 
16 from malfeasance or willful misconduct. 
17 As to the training question which is extremely 
18 important to me, you have in the audience today several 
19 members of the Board of Directors of the new California 
20 Association of Public Retirement Administrators, actually 
21 called CALAPRS, California Association of Public Retirement 
22 Systems. And in fact under Tab J there is a one-page 
23 memorandum. It essentially notes that that group now 
24 represents about 97 percent of the assets in public pension 
25 plans in the State of California and its principal purpose is 
26 to help us improve our ability to communicate with one 
27 another and develop training opportunities for both trustees 
28 and administrators. 
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1 In c , e ustees w be mee ng here in 
2 Sacram o in r own worksh next week to mapping out 
3 an a a for them es in the future, but we think that 
4 education is going to be critical to us as California law 
5 begins to develop in this area. 
6 CH RMAN McCORQUODALE: Has the PERS Board ever 
7 considered suing an outside manager? 
8 • McCAUSLAND: I understand that there is 
9 litigation at's current been sponsored by our or brought 
10 by our ster system. PERS has participated in class action 
11 lawsuits ag nst, in u.s. Steel purchase of Marathon and 
12 a in in the inental Illinois take over, but at this 
13 nt in time we have never felt that anyone involved with 
14 
15 
16 
1 
18 
21 
e system has been involved in a breach that would create a 
t pattern that wo d support litigation. 
RMAN McCORQUODALE: I ess e first question I 
uld ave sked b ore that one is is there a review 
proc s 
out de 
de sion 
or your management on the activities of 
g s to insure 
yes o no they 
at periodically you make a 
e not, they have been prudent 
or haven't been 
MR. McCA 
t is in the 
AND: 
e 
dent? 
answer to that e answer to 
te area ere we're purcha ng real 
esta eq 
proper 
owner ip interests in buildin , we do that 
proper almost on a quarterly basis. In the 
st ck area which i e on other area where we use external 
management, we wa the portfolio very closely but quite 
ere a e v rtu no holdings in that portfolio 
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1 that wouldn't pass the test of prudence at the time they were 
2 purchased based on the knowledge generally available to 
3 experts. We do not have an internal procedure for routinely 
4 checking whether or not one of our outside managers has 
5 missed the mark, and I think in large measure that's because 
6 we're so explicit about the kinds of securities they can 
7 purchase with the money they have available to them. 
8 In fact, PERS has had an ongoing relationship with 
9 Citicorp and I believe one of your witnesses this afternoon 
10 can tell you a little bit about the evolution of that 
11 process. PERS used to identify name by name by name which 
12 stocks could be purchased. PERS still in large measure 
13 actually executes the purchase and sale of the stock. So the 
14 principal reliance on the external manager to date has been 
15 for professional advice and they are currently in far more 
16 discretionary control of the fund than they ever were before 
17 but they still don't have full totally delegated 
18 responsibility for the whole package. 
19 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Going back to the fiduciary 
20 counsel, what role does the fiduciary counsel have on 
21 individual investment activities of PERS? 
22 MR. McCAUSLAND: Most recently the fiduciary counsel 
23 has been asked to opine on the draft of a new investment 
24 resolution. The thrust of the new resolution is to fully 
25 incorporate all of the ramifications of Prop 21 changes. So 
26 we wanted to make certain that that was a legally defensible 
27 document. More recently or quite recently the counsel was 
28 asked for an informal opinion as to whether a no vote on an 
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investment excused a due ary om liab i s 
2 essenti it's a individual case case posing o a 
3 question where we're not convinced e have sufficie t 
4 background to know the answer. By the way, the answer 1s 
5 voting no does not get you off the look. Assuring that 
6 you're participating in a legitimate process is the only 
7 thing that can get you off the hook. 
8 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Suppose you have an 
9 absolutely legitimate very, the greatest investment proposal 
10 in the world and it was going to return even better than Mr. 
11 Elder nks it uld return and you voted no. Would that 
12 be imprudent? 
13 MR. McCAUSLAND: Only if it is clear that you had 
14 voted no for a totally specious reason and someone took you 
15 to task for it. But if you had a good, legitimate, rational, 
16 preferab based on econ cs, reason for voting no, then 
at d not i udent. But that is a very interesting 
8 i ue t arising in San Francisco because there is a 
19 major est e move going on there where one of the Board 
members is trac ng portfolio and every time the Board 
21 does something that that trustee believes is not consistent 
28 
ith s duci ry du he sets that up in a mock portfolio. 
h 
em 
has every intention of ing ck some day and t 
e er won or lost and he intends if they lo 
be an anta ist in any litigation. 
One the di culties you have for instance, 
ling 
to 
T-B 1 for the last three months have only yielded 1. So 
there's no re sure thing anyplace out there in the market. 
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1 1.85 is not going to get us off the ground. So the markets 
2 are like a whole series of interacting roller coasters or 
3 crap shoots that make Marriots look pretty simplistic in 
4 comparison. No reference to your district. 
5 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Senator Alquist's district. 
6 MR. McCAUSLAND: So you have to be in all markets in 
1 varying proportions at different times in order to protect 
8 your assets because Assemblyman Elder's concerns are 
9 extremely legitimate. If you just enter it for the crap 
10 shoot, you won't get in trouble in the long run. So you have 
11 to have a very balanced perspective and these reports are a 
12 fairly interesting primer in terms of the kind of decisions 
13 that investors make when they're trying to manage large pools 
14 of assets. 
15 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Going back to the fiduciary 
16 counsel once again. Do they review the investment management 
11 contracts? When you contract with an outside manager, does 
18 the counsel review that contract? 
19 MR. McCAUSLAND: That has not been the case to date, 
20 no. However, we are in the process of developing 
21 performance-based contracts where a significant portion of 
22 the manager's fee will be based on how well the portfolio 
23 does. In fact, there's an example of that in the binder. It 
24 happens to be the performance formula that goes with Greta 
25 Marshall, our Investment Manager. Also Citicorp has agreed 
26 to a performance-based formula. And as those contracts get 
21 increasingly complex, we may seek outside counsel's 
28 participation in that process. 
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CHAIRMAN McCO UODALE: 
Sen a Car er s joined us 
you'd like to ask? 
All ri t. 
Do you hav 
questions? 
any questions 
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4 SENATOR CARPENTER: I got in a little late, Sid, but 
5 you were saying you did 29 percent last year on your market? 
6 MR. Me AND: Yes. That's on the market value. 
7 SENATOR CARPENTER: Was that in fiscal '85? 
8 MR. McCA AND That was in cal en dar '85. Fi seal 
9 '85 --
10 SENATOR CARPENTER: Oh, excuse me, calendar '85. 
11 MR. McCAUSLAND: Calendar '85, right. 
12 SENATOR CARPENTER: What was the Dow over that 
13 pe od? 
14 MR. McCAUSLAND: The Dow, let me do it right. We 
15 compare ourselves to the Standard and Poor's 500. The Dow 
16 has a 3 stocks in it. And I'll break it down some. The 
17 s k olio for the year did 33.38. The S & P 500 d 
18 31.8 34.18 So essentially Dow 34, S & P 500, 
19 very ose to 33, I'm sorry 32, and PERS did essentially 33. 
we were nestled between the S & P and the Dow last year. 
21 For bonds for the year, PERS did 29.66. Let's call 
28 
that 30. omon Brothers which is a long index, did 30. 
The L n Brothers index which is about seven years long, 
did 21. So our 29.66 looked pretty good there. 
mortgages for the year we had a 31.48 return and 
th oman Brothers mortgage index went up about 25.68. 
Cash which is an interesting thing because we got in an 
lot of trou e several years ago for not being into cash 
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1 because there were phenomenal returns here when inflation was 
2 up. We did nine, and the T-Bills for the year did 8.459. 
3 And those are continuing to trend down. So the total for the 
4 whole portfolio was 28.88 or 29. 
5 SENATOR CARPENTER: Given the difficulties of 
6 matching the Dow or the S & P 500 with the size of your 
7 portfolio, and the size, that size offers unusual 
8 difficulties and problems. 
9 MR. McCAUSLAND: We think so. 
10 SENATOR CARPENTER: Would we be just as well off to 
11 go with the kinds of mutual funds that just simply follow the 
12 
13 
Dow? 
MR. McCAUSLAND: We consider ourselves like that. 
14 And quite honestly we have some nine billion dollars in stock 
15 right now and four and a half of that is indexed -- well, let 
16 me give you some, since we've got the tape running here, let 
17 me be more precise here. We have nine and a half -- no, it 
18 has been growing. This is a good market. We have 10.5 
19 billion in stocks and about half of that is in an index fund 
20 and the other half is currently actively managed. 
21 Last year the index fund earned 33.94 and the active 
22 fund earned 33.82. So last year the index fund did a little 
23 bit better than the active, but this year the active is doing 
24 a little bit better or the last three months the active is 
25 doing better than the index. But the answer is that PERS 
26 currently has half a billion dollars on half of its stock 
27 portfolio, half of its stock portfolio indexed against the 
28 S & P 500. We also have an additional billion dollars that 
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we're slow but s re inves ng in some i ernal 
ds that ic e smaller segments of m 
you have to be awfully g to be in the largest 5 
managed 
t because 
4 companies. 
5 So of the 840 companies that are curren in our 
6 portfolio, at least half of them are dedicated to just trying 
7 to keep up with the market, with the S & P 500. And quite 
8 honest when you do that, you don't buy and sell as much. 
9 So you don't have transaction costs. So you are actually 
10 saving quite a bit of money and we are beating most managers 
11 because in la measure we don't have as high transaction 
12 costs. We 1 re out performing about two-thirds of the stock 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
1 
20 
21 
managers in the country and about 94 percent of the bond 
managers in the country and that has a lot to do with the way 
e port io is sitioned in the early 1980's. 
s PENTER: I certainly can't fault that 
strategy. But f one accepts that strategy, is it also 
necessary to pay high fund management s? 
MR. McCA AND: That's something that we're in the 
process of essential going through a very deliberate system 
of evaluating Greta Marshall who has taken the role of 
22 inves ent manager for us and essentially manages our 
24 
26 
nternal sta 
managers is 
as well as our relationships with external 
committed to determining during her tenure 
here whether or not we can add any value by being active 
managers. If numbers don't prove it out and we get 
quart perrormance numbers on all parts of the 
28 io -- I just gave you about six pages in here from 
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1 Wilshire Associates under one of the tabs -- but if any of 
2 the management styles or portions of the portfolio don't 
3 payoff every time, we'll just.throw that money into the 
4 index. There is no reluctance to do that at all. Right now 
5 we're just making sure that that would be the prudent thing 
6 to do by pushing out and trying the various areas. 
7 SENATOR CARPENTER: Thank you. 
8 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Mr. McCausland, you've indicated 
9 $33 billion. Is that as of June 30 last year? 
10 MR. McCAUSLAND: That's a market value as of 
11 December 31st. 
12 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: So the recent runup reflects 
13 that. 
14 MR. McCAUSLAND: Dramatic runup. 
15 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: What about your order execution 
16 costs. Do you have some kind of -- how do you determine 
17 who's going to do the order to buy "X" thousand shares or 
18 sell "X" million shares? Do you have a long-term contract 
19 with like a Charles Schwab or 
20 MR. McCAUSLAND: I did not bring the annual 
21 financial report of investment activities, but I'll make sure 
22 you have one. We have a list on the back of that. As I 
23 recall there's about 35 or 40 firms on there that actually do 
24 transactions for PERS. Those transactions are all initiated 
25 by PERS staff and essentially it's all on a best execution 
26 basis, but because of the huge volume or the huge size of the 
27 parcels we buy, there are really probably fewer than 50 firms 
28 in the country that deal in that size. So it's not too 
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1 difficult to know where you got to go to find a buyer or 
2 
3 
seller on any given issue. 
EMBLYMAN ER: be long-term contracts would 
4 afford a lower rate it seems to me. 
5 MR. McCAUSLAND: Well, interestingly enough because 
6 we pay an average of less than four cents a share for stock 
7 transactions and each year we ratchet that down a lit e 
8 tighter and some of the firms say I'm not going to do 
9 business with you anymore, but they always come back a week 
10 from Wednesday with a deal that they know we can't pass up. 
11 we have been pretty successful at reducing fees 
12 and shaving points as best we can. We're a couple of months 
13 away from the com ete installation of a tracking system that 
14 will allow us to begin to evaluate market impact. Because 
15 when you deal in size, you frequently pay a premium for 
6 moving a large ock in and out of the market place. And 
17 there's no doubt in our mind that we can continue to make 
money by ening up on e transaction costs. 
19 ELDER: Let me just ask you, the point 
int gued me. ey come to you with a deal you can't turn 
21 down. I thou t this was the other way around, that you 
22 initiated the order to sell or How is it that they can 
come to you as it were? 
• McCAUSLAND: Well, interestingly enough, if 
you've been, for instance, accumulating Fannie Mae mortgage 
packages in the 20-year ran over the last six weeks and 
27 pee e have seen your trading range, and they happen to get 
50 million in this morning, they 11 ca you to see if you 
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1 want five or ten or 50 of it. So it's essentially what 
2 people who are nosing around on the street know about you. 
3 Our bond portfolio is one of the largest purchases 
4 of mortgages in the entire country. So any time you get a 
5 large block of mortgages, we're liable to get a phone call. 
6 So we don't have to initiate them all. In fact, usually 
7 that's the best way to get a good price is they know that 
8 they can move it fast with you, so they'll dicker more. 
9 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: One last thing here. I see in 
10 your, this is your goals 
11 MR. McCAUSLAND: Yes, sir. 
12 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: -- your mission. I don't see 
13 any targeted rate of return. 
14 MR. McCAUSLAND: That's a very good point. A 
15 targeted rate of return is in your binder. 
16 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Why would that be under your 
17 goals? 
18 MR. McCAUSLAND: Well, this particular set of goals 
19 is a set of goals that the administrative management group 
took to the Board of Administration about a year ago at the 
21 same time that the investment plan was being formalized, and 
under Tab E you have the investment plan which lays out the 
23 various allocation components but that's not the best way to 
24 show you. We now have an explicit set of goals and 
objectives and let me just find out which page they're on 
26 
27 
here. 
The explicit numbers are on the fifth page of Tab D. 
28 There are five year performance objectives under Tab E at 
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Page 5 and that shows essential what w think the various 
pieces of the portfolio d consist of and it shows that 
3 e want to make the eturn four percent in excess of the 
4 C 8.5 percent is our current actuarial rate. ch tab 
5 do you have? 
6 
7 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: I have Tab E. 
MR. Me SLAND: D, I'm sorry, Tab D, Page 5. My 
8 enunciation has never been very good. 
9 The most interesting part of that is objectives for 
10 individual portfolio components at the bottom of the page. 
11 We think that the index portion of the stock portfolio should 
12 do a return equal to the S & P. That if you're going to 
13 for active management, it should do at least one percent 
14 better than the S & P, and in the long-term fixed income 
15 stu you see va ous expected rates of return there. And 
16 the next page, Page 6, shows you our theoretical analysis of 
1 wh d erent investment pieces are ng to yi d as of 
1 time th report was pr red, and if you weight that by 
9 the various rts of the por olio, you get a total fund 
urn over f e-year period of 11.3 percent a year. 
21 EMBL ELDER: So your r at e assumed 
22 a tuar al rate of 8.5 percent, D-5, has been exceeded in this 
28 
ast 12-month pe od by a significant amount? 
AND: It has been exceeded for the last 
four years It will probab be exceeded for the next four 
years. But that number drives e actuarial models that go 
ut a minimum of 30 years into the future. And we're not 
convinced -- and e current market is be nning to suggest 
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1 that we may be optimistic. We don't believe that 8.5 is an 
2 unrealistic 30-year number because if inflation gets back 
3 down to three or four percent-- it's averaged four percent 
~ for the last five y~ars now-- then it's very hard to get 
5 real rates of return for a large portfolio that are more than 
6 four and a half percent over the CPI. So we think the 8.5 
7 is --
8 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: What did you base --
9 MR. McCAUSLAND: --the theoretical number. 
10 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: What did you base the employer 
11 rate reduction on the PERS contributions on? 
12 MR. McCAUSLAND: This year the actuarial interest 
13 assumption stated 8.5 but the salary assumption dropped from 
14 the old salary assumption of eight percent to a new salary 
15 assumption of seven percent and it was that big increase 
16 between the salary assumption and the assumed interest 
17 assumption --
18 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: So that would be a half percent 
19 reduction in costs or future costs and that accounts for what 
20 you reduced the PERS rates on all contracting agencies, about 
21 that? 
22 MR. McCAUSLAND: I can't do the math you just did, 
23 but, yes, there is a range and it's real interesting. It's 
2~ driven mostly by the size of the individual unfunded 
25 liabilities, but the average is between 12 and 15 percent. 
26 But we've seen some safety groups less than one percent, some 
27 miscellaneous groups greater than ~9 percent. It's just a 
28 phenomenal difference, mostly based on the size of the 
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un 
M • Me 
ASSEMBLYMAN 
0 a pa ar stem? 
So your market performance h d 
5 absolutely nothing to do with your rates, it was more the 
6 
7 
8 
9 
ct 1 ation? 
• Me That is in large measure -- our 
excellent performance has resulted om the fact that when 
double digiti ation went away four years ago, we were 
10 positioned in a bond portfolio that paid 50 to 60 cents on 
11 the dollar for. Today that bond portfolio is maybe worth 
12 $1.10 for each 65 cents we put in. So, yes, a tremendous 
13 amount of the value of this portfolio today is based on the 
14 
15 
16 
17 
1 
9 
20 
2 
22 
28 
bet that you couldn't sustain double digit inflation. t 
n ssentia Mel Petersen's strategy throu out the 
end 
ext rem 
seven es and it positioned the portfoli 
this market valley? 
YMAN n the optimum would have been 
su Bills at 17 percent? 
MR. McCAU We bought -- well, actual the 
imum and is is an area that you like quite a bit, I 
d 1 t ev 0 t up the o urn was to buy mortgages 
at 65 cents on the la and we bou t more of those than 
any se in country did. We also bou t more bonds 
than anybo else in the coun did. Many of them were 
treasuries. eres ng enou 1 you buy those essenti ly 
yielding 15, 16, 17 percent, today the 15-year rate for a 
ERS home loa is 9.625. 're final get ng that rate 
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1 down where the members might just be able to get something 
2 out of that like you wanted us to a long time ago. 
3 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: We'll hear more about that later 
4 I'm sure. 
5 MR. McCAUSLAND: I know I will too, won't I? 
6 
7 
(Laughter.) 
CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: All right, any other 
8 questions? 
9 MR. McCAUSLAND: It's been a real pleasure. Thank 
10 you very much, sir. 
11 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Just curious on your mission 
12 paper here, you talk about public employees, retirees and 
13 beneficiaries and then repeat that. Then at the bottom it 
14 says, "promote understanding of the PERS program for members, 
15 employees, employers, state officials and the public." And 
16 then if you look at the Prop 21, it talks about with respect 
17 to the system solely in the interest of and for the exclusive 
18 purposes of providing benefits to participants and their 
19 beneficiaries, minimizing employer contributions thereto 
goes back to the question I asked earlier. Who are the 
21 beneficiaries here? 
22 MR. McCAUSLAND: Our reading of the Constitution 
23 is, well, an employee you know, a retiree you know. A 
24 beneficiary is an individual who has a relationship with a 
PERS member and ultimately draws a benefit as a result of 
that relationship. If a member dies, the spouse gets the 
benefit. 
28 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: So when the Constitution 
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2 
ks about providing ts to par 
neficia es, is a participant, is a 
r ci nt now? 
MR. McCAUSLAND: Quite honest 
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pants and their 
1 person a 
California law 
ev ved over the years and has various classes of membership, 
t in terms of the Constitution I believe that participant 
and beneficiary uld b read as a se and that that 
applies to the current active members, vested inactive 
members o left their money with us but don't work around 
here anymore who get a benefit someday, any eligible spouse 
or family member or individual with a r a onship with a 
member that co d draw a benefit. 
So it's essen ally 750,000 plus people who are 
rtici nts and beneficiaries and quite honestly the court 
s never decided on that speci c language there because we 
b ieve i elf rmonizes with what's already in the law. 
It' us e law has evolved like a patchwork quilt. You 
on't want to get into that. 
CH R McCORQUODALE: So if you have some money 
a able for be ts, it would leave your Board free to 
make, to take a on ei er at it should be used to 
reduce em oyer con butions, or it co d go to improve the 
irement of current retirees or it d be used to improve 
dea benefit w wo d paid to neficiary. 
MR McCA AND: All of the above and all of them to 
various degree • In fact, last year you had a classic ill 
in the Investment Div dend Disbursement Account Bill That 
b 1 res ted in $ m lion transfer of assets to 
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1 essentially employer accounts, so that was part of the 
2 minimizing employer cost activity. At the same time it 
3 extended to 1992 a cost of living benefit to retirees that 
4 costs the fund money over time. 
5 So you're constantly trying to blend and balance, 
6 especially under Prop 21, the requirement to reduce employer 
7 cost while serving the beneficiary's needs. 
8 By the way we think the various elements of that 
9 constitutional provision are reflected in here, but I don't 
10 want to take you through these goals and missions. We'll do 
11 that some other day. 
12 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: All right. No other 
13 questions, thank you. 
14 MR. McCAUSLAND: Thank you very much. 
15 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Next witness is John Graf, 
16 Citicorp Investment Management Company. 
17 MR. GRAF: My name is John Graf. I am the Regional 
18 Manager of Citicorp Investment Management in San Francisco, 
19 where we have nondiscretionary investment advisory 
responsibility for segments of the PERS common stock 
21 portfolio. I've been asked to talk about how Proposition 21 
22 affected our role as equity investment advisor for PERS, and 
further I've been requested to discuss how we as an 
investment manager discharge our fiduciary responsibility as 
25 we go through the investment process. 
26 Now, I won't read all the comments that you have in 
front of you because some of that has been covered by some of 
28 the other managers, but I'll go through and pick out the 
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ghli ts. 
r ba ound, since we a ise on e acti 
managed portion of the common stock portfolio, the issue of 
overall asset mix, that is, the ratio of stocks, bonds, and 
real estate, et cetera, has never been within our scope of 
responsibility. 
As y know, Proposition 21 eliminated the 
constitutio constraints which m have n appropriate to 
the situation 20 years ago but became unnecessary and a 
potentially costly incumbrance in the present circumstances. 
In addition to the 25 percent 1 ta on on equities, there 
are a number of criteria that had contained opposite common 
stocks and that was enumerated by the first speaker. 
Suffice it to say that these guidelines precluded 
investments in many companies, for instance, which are coming 
out e 9 re s on er having restructured their 
o rations nd taken one-time write offs. 
s a exam e of the com nies that were precluded 
from inv ent because of the pre- 21 guidelines, we 
20 ave Eastman Kodak Caterpillar Tractor, AT & T and General 
21 Motor among an illustrious list of others. It also 
22 re uded companies which had decided not to pay a dividend 
bu rather to reinvest earnings in the company's further 
24 ow 
, in practical terms the effect of Proposition 21 
on our function as equity advisor was to substantial expand 
e univ se of companies from which we could choose stocks 
8 for the RS io. In mid-19 there were about 200 
ION (916 
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1 stocks on the S approved list, the authorized list of 
2 investments. And that compared with Citicorp's authorized 
3 list of investments ch d about three times as many 
4 stocks. 
5 While the number of actual holdings in the PERS 
6 portfolio did not increase significantly as a result of 
7 Proposition 21, the point is that PERS had access to a wider 
8 array of opportunities. Realistically, because of PERS large 
9 size, significant numbers of these additional companies were 
10 not considered for investment because PERS would have to take 
11 a large position in a smaller company to get a meaningful 
12 dollar exposure in the portfolio. 
13 For instance, to invest one-half of one percent of 
14 the active segment of the PERS fund, stock fund, in a company 
15 with a quarter of a billion dollars in stock outstanding 
16 would require taking a ten percent position in the company. 
17 I might add here parenthetically that the recent 
18 move by PERS to fracture the fund and give smaller pieces to 
19 discretionary managers with complimentary styles will get 
around that problem. 
2 Now, while removing the constraints Proposition 21 
28 
also required that the funds be invested in accordance with 
ERISA standards and the prudent expert rule. Meaning, 
essentially, that the management of the portfolio would be 
ect to the exacting degree of care that a prudent 
edgeable investigator familiar with the market would 
exercise under similar circumstances. 
Prop 21 also mandated that we as advisors perform 
s 0 AN COR PO (9i6) 362-2345 
81 
in e in erest pa ti nts 1 
2 
3 
our du e ex us 
benefi a es. Last e measure eq red investments 
be d s e so a to nimize the risk of 1 s. 
4 The overall equity portfolio including the ctive 
5 and passive segments was already w 1 diversif ed this 
6 has lit e impact on our a vities. 
7 In terms of the investment process bo within 
8 ticorp and as it relates to PERS, we ways viewed 
9 ourselves as duciaries even prior to Prop 21. In all of 
10 
1 1 
12 
13 
our inv 
guided by the 
activities, including that for PERS, we were 
on of exclusive 
always held to the standards of 
rule even prior t ER 
nefits and f t we would 
erstwhile prudent man 
1 On the matter of how prudence and fiduciary 
5 respon bili are maintained and monitored within Citicorp, 
16 er re several check points. We are governed by the 
7 stment Advi ors Act 1940 with its reporting 
8 requi 
indepen 
c itt 
ent • inv ent activities are moni ed by 
n ud tors who re t to Fiduciary Review 
of e ticorp Board. A committee of senior 
olio managers reviews accounts ea year to be sure that 
a ed accor e w th governi documents and 
c o ec es nd t s the control of the currencies 
at nine. Our transactions are monitored d ly 
d aggregate por olio diversification is i tern 
review 
cy 
com ian e our prevailing investm t 
corp has a ritten icy re rding usive 
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1 benefit which requires undivided loyalty to our clients. 
2 This affects such items as security trading must be 
3 accomplished through brokers who provide the most efficient 
4 and price effective executions. We are precluded from using 
5 Citicorp's own money market desk or our discount brokerage 
6 unit when completing trades. We may not buy any Citicorp 
7 securities for our clients. Uninvested cash balances must be 
8 kept at the lowest pos ble level, and indeed that usually 
9 means zero with today's technology for sweeping accounts. 
10 Portfolio managers must get prior clearance before 
11 completing trades for their personal portfolios. That's 
12 designed to prevent dealing in stocks which are currently 
13 being purchased or sold for clients. 
14 We also discharge our day-to-day obligations to be 
15 prudent through ongoing economic and investment research and 
16 the maintenance of a highly qualified staff of analysts, 
17 portfolio managers and traders. So our fiduciary 
18 responsibility begins with a clear understanding of client 
19 objectives and tolerance for risk, and through the 
construction and ongoing maintenance of a portfolio that's 
2 responsive to those requirements and within the framework of 
22 our investment outlook. 
In essence, 21 as it related to prudence and 
duciary responsibility did not alter the way we were 
working with PERS. We continue to meet with the Investment 
Committee of the Board every other month to report on 
investment policy and the portfolio and to discuss 
28 performance. Our research material continued to be sent to 
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3 
the st f with om e ave i ually d i on tact 
concerning our investment recomm da ions, a a i e past 
we wo meet with ff as needed to d scuss strategy. 
The major change from Prop 21 with regard to our 
e was the increased latitude afforded by the imination 
con aints. 
se ar my prepared comments. 
MAN McCO UODALE: All right. What is your 
you ard discus 
fiduciary insurance. 
on about the insurance policy, the 
What's your feeling about that? Is 
at 
ex 
nece sary 
ditu 
G 
ing for someone like PERS to have or is it 
t may not be necessary? 
That's a very fficult call. I can talk 
14 about our own tuation as it relates to similar types of 
5 licies. We have found at coverage is just not avail e 
6 a any ng even approa ng reasonable costs. In fact, I'm 
1 somew t sur sed that PERS has been able to get the 
, 
20 
21 
24 
8 
g hav even at what would seem to be a high cost. 
may be of consolation to the committee here that S 
has ca 
ins ra 
nat 
ized on 
e companie 
e sent 
S rtf io. 
to coverage. 
MR. G 
t situa on by investing in these 
Indeed, insurance companies of this 
ne of e large concentrations in the 
ELD Maybe we know why they were a e 
That's quite possi e. 
But we, as an ins tution, we're self-insuring n 
ec s e ast ctober and most f our peer cornpanie are 
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1 ng the same thing. 
2 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Do you have any role 
3 involved with the pooling of funds? I would guess that if 
4 the local retirement system and the PERS, others pooled their 
5 funds -- are you involved with that? 
6 MR. GRAF: No, we're not at present. The portfolio 
7 that we advise PERS on is a separate portfolio and indeed all 
8 of the portfolios that we manage in San Francisco are 
9 separate and not comingled for all of our range of clients. 
10 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: We talk about review of 
11 contracts by fiduciary counsel. I would assume that the 
12 contract that you have with PERS is reviewed on your end? 
13 MR. GRAF: Yes. 
14 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: And you indicated, I think 
15 it was in your firm, doesn't have any objections to review by 
16 fiduciary counsel. Do you see, from your standpoint, is 
17 there an advantage or disadvantage to PERS having a fiduciary 
18 counsel. 
19 MR. GRAF: Well, I must plead ignorance quite 
20 frankly. We do not have a fiduciary counsel per se. We have 
21 two lawyers on our staff in-house who advise on a wide range 
22 of topics including our fiduciary responsibility and dealing 
with issues of compliance to our own internal guidelines as 
well as external regulations. I really don't know enough 
about the subject quite frankly to say whether PERS should 
have that fiduciary co~nsel. 
27 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: You mentioned that one, the 
28 only way in which PERS could invest in small c9mpanies is by 
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1 hiring more investment managers and divid ng up the a sets. 
2 How many managers do you ink d need n order to make 
a estm nt n a sm ompany possible? Hav y de 
4 review of that 
5 
6 
MR. GRAF Well, not as such, but there are some 
reactions to at. First I would underscore the comments 
7 that Sid made that the system ri t now is investing in a, 
8 what is in essence, as I understand it, a replication of an 
9 index of small companies. So they are getting broad exposure 
10 
11 
to sm companies. But in a, take a typical portfolio at 
Citicorp in the ran of several dred million lars, we 
12 mi t have companies, and indeed we would have companies in 
13 
14 
15 
9 
2 
23 
that port io that would be of somewhat sm ler 
ca 
port 
ization than we had st rical advised for the P 
io or the reason tha if you wanted to limit the 
e pos e 1 n th 
fol o 
company, n a four or five b lion dollar 
po sure w d be so i intesimal it wouldn't 
have 
na 
c 
1 
a d 
size 
i 
consequence one way or the other. 
breaking down and hiring a cadre active 
s, to o 
as w 
t ry 
degree what you hav s a 
as a portfolio sto 
tfoli of ma ers is 
les. y will no onger 
io of 
And the 
that you've got 
just be reflecting 
r i s in their tfolio which I thin 
ong run to mi ze a til i in a portfolio 
w also g e te size pieces more rna na gea bl e 
eces in the area of a cou e few dred million 
a s wherein a nager could pu a company that has a 
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1 capitalization of a quarter of a billion dollars and it would 
2 have an impact on that portfolio. 
3 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: How much direction do you 
4 get from the PERS staff over what stocks or what types of 
5 stocks to purchase? 
6 MR. GRAF: Generally speaking the direction goes in 
7 the other direction on that portion for which we advise. 
8 When we meet with the staff and when we meet with the 
9 Investment Committee of the Board, we present our investment 
10 outlook and our strategy. And within that and against the 
11 background of our own research, we will pick stocks to 
12 recommend for them to buy or sell. 
13 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Suppose you have another 
14 similar client as PERS and you were, and you had within the 
15 organization a manager buying and selling the same stock. 
16 How do you keep conflict from occurring? 
17 MR. GRAF: That's a good question. It would be a 
18 very rare occurrence internally if we're buying and selling 
19 the same stock. But we generally buy the same stock for a 
20 number of portfolios. Indeed, for accounts that have similar 
21 objectives, we should be buying the same stock. There's no 
22 compelling reason to do otherwise. So what we do is we'll 
put a block with our trader in New York and as that block is 
24 executed we will do a pro rata distribution across those 
25 accounts, either a purchase or a sell. 
26 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: You mentioned 
27 diversification as a means of reducing risk. Are there other 
28 strategies that would reduce risk? Is that the best one? 
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n over e 
to reduce risk is indeed d ersification and I 
s ra gy 
ink this 
goes to Mr. El er's nt about looking at the mar sat the 
be nning of the year and trying to make a judgm as to 
what the rate of return might be from stocks, bonds, bills 
and other investment. We do that. We do it in a very 
so cated kind of a way through modeling. But even wi 
the hi degree of confidence that we have in our mod s 
9 which have been remarkably accurate in the last few years, I 
10 still would not feel, would not have felt confident going in 
11 1985 and putting a 100 percent of our portfolio income in 
12 cks or for that matter at the beginning of this year when 
13 we were forecasting that stocks would generate returns 
4 something on the order of 18 percent this year, which almost 
15 soun s incre ible ter a gain of one-third last year. We 
be -- ou ntuitive reaction was to temper the results 
7 mode 1 y know, balance funds, and have an equity 
8 expos re ing on e order of two-thirds of the 
9 tf 
At same time we also felt that bonds were 
2 a ractiv cause bonds were st providing high real 
r s even ou nominal retu ns had come down The 
east attractive area was and continues to be in our view 
short-term investments. 
not sure if I answered your ue ion direct 
AIR CORQUODALE: For a $33 billion portf io 
is there a r e of umb or do you have a feeling about the 
2 number o mana ers needed for that? 
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1 MR. GRAF: It's a difficult issue because what you 
2 don't want to do is catch yourself coming around the other 
3 end. That is, you don 1 t want to have so many managers that 
4 what you end up with in aggregate is a replication of the 
5 S & P, an expensive replication of the S & P because you've 
6 got fees and transaction costs. So I've got a high degree of 
7 confidence that Sid and Greta Marshall on the staff are real 
8 capable people. I'm not offering that as flatery. I really 
9 am impressed with them. And that they will monitor the 
10 aggregate portfolios so that when they do hold it up to the 
11 light, they'll be sure that there is a difference to the 
12 S & P, A, and B, over time to monitor performance to make 
13 sure that the managers are adding value to the S & P. 
14 Somebody said here earlier that the managers are the 
15 market which is by definition virtually correct. If the 
16 institutions are 70 percent of the trades, although still 
17 only about a third of the holdings. So they do control 
18 largely the day-to-day transaction volume in the market. But 
19 still, if half the managers are going to be above the S & P 
20 over time and half below, the goal of the staff is to find 
21 those managers that will be on the top side as we have been 
for the last few years and especially last year. 
23 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Dave. 
24 Very good. Well, thank you. Appreciate your 
25 comments. 
26 MR. GRAF: You're welcome. 
27 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Our next witness is Bruce 
28 Moore, Orange County Employees' Retirement System. 
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MR. MOO d afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of 
the ornmi e thi is Mr. Brunner who s my Vice Chairman I 
invited ong to ay. name is Bruc Moore. I rn current 
e Ch rman of the Orange County Employees' irement 
System. I am an ected member of the Board that is, I have 
a county job and my fellow employees ect me to that 
particular position 
member. I am from 
Mr. Brunner re is so an ected 
general side. Mr. Brunner is from the 
9 safety side and his job in the County of Orange is a 
10 Lieutenant with the Orange County Sheriff's Department. Mine 
11 is as a Deputy Probation Officer. 
12 I have been asked today to speak in the area of 
13 fiduciary counsel or hiring fiduciary counsel. Fiduciary, 
14 
15 
7 
1 
19 
20 
21 
s can 
one. 
sec ons 
unfortuna 
ther be a very simple solution or a very complex 
by that I mean is that ere are o primary 
e ov ernme e ch cover this area. And 
ey are somewhat mutually exclusive of each 
does create some inherent problems which I would 
ke to commen 0 . 
irst is 31529 and 3 5 the Governm 
Co e i basic spells out that the district attorney or 
the coun counsel 1 counse to e Board of 37 Act 
u e and tha f s what Orange County is part of the 37 
Act And it goes o to explain at if there is a conflict 
i or for other com ling reasons, then e Board 
may go out nd to seek other outside counsel in order to get 
their s on defend themselves or to do whatever they 
is nece ry 
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1 However, the code also calls for an enabling 
2 resolution from the Board of Supervisors of the counties in 
3 order to give the Board of Retirement the permission in which 
4 to exercise that duty. 
5 The second section of the Government Code speaks in 
6 31607 to financial issues only, and that is, those are issues 
7 which tend to impact most directly to financial matters which 
8 come before the Board. A typical example would be where the 
9 Board may wish to look at some contractural issues and 
10 in-house attorneys, that is, quote, county counsel of the 
11 county is unable to exercise their ability there. A typical 
12 example was at our Board meeting yesterday where we looked at 
13 some contracts in terms of real estate purchases that we had 
14 made. And county counsel said in part the contracts look 
15 good to them, however, they did not have any in-house 
16 expertise in relation to some contractural matters. So that 
17 would give the Board certainly the opportunity as county 
18 counsel states in order to let the Board of Retirement go out 
19 and seek other outside counsel. And we do have one attorney 
20 on retainer that does that for us. 
21 However, the problem does come about in terms of 
22 counsel for the retirement system. In listening to all of 
23 the other speakers here that gave testimony today, especially 
24 the attorneys, and Mr. Brunner and myself are fiduciaries, 
25 that is, we have the ultimate responsibility. It is somewhat 
26 like hearing about your own autopsy and to hear what is being 
27 disected after you have passed away. 
28 Counsel is an overall protection of the system, of 
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4 benefits for the members of the system. However, as you have 
5 heard today, I think very graphically, is that we live in a 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
6 
17 
8 
9 
very lega istic soci and Proposition 21 has thrusted us 
into a totally new arena wherein we are being looked at very 
cautiously or car ully and under a microscope which also 
leads that 1 nine members of the Board have a great deal of 
expo sure. 
myself, Mr. Brunner and some of the other 
members, both appointed and elected members, do not 
p rticularly e any insurance whatsoever to cover our 
fiduciary responsibility. Our county counsel has addressed 
matter th ere are two members of the Board whi 
cou wo d rticularly indemnify in case of any type 
e Board of irement, and those, number 
0 , wo d easurer- x Collector of the county and 
e second w d e member of the Board of Supervisors 
t on r Board. And in some counties the Board of 
i r membe does not choose to sit and that is an 
appointed position the Board of Supervisors. That lets 
the re t of wrestle with this problem on a 
day-to-day d individu basis. If, for exam e, the fund 
s sued, whatever reaso other than say some direct 
nan al misgiv ngs and even this is in a gray area, and s 
not covered com et in either Government Code, is where do 
8 get coun protect our interests and the interests of 
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1 the fund? 
2 In Orange County, in some counties, this is very 
3 clearly, has been taken care of through enabling resolutions. 
4 In Orange County it is not. The Board of Supervisors has 
5 remained silent on the issue in our county, although we have 
6 requested, the Board of Retirement has requested that 
7 enabling resolution and for whatever particular reasons, the 
8 Board of Supervisors feel that that is not a necessary item 
9 at this particular time. 
10 So then what we really have in Prop 21 kind of 
11 issues are who then is going to defend the Board of 
12 Retirement. I think then, is it going to be county counsel? 
13 The question is is county counsel, does county counsel have 
14 enough staff and expertise aboard in order to take care of 
15 those suits and other issues which it will financially impact 
16 the Board of Retirement. 
17 I had attended a conference approximately six months 
18 ago in talking about, the chairman has talked about fiduciary 
19 insurance, and it was primarily made up of a lot of attorneys 
20 and one of the things that they did point out is that to a 
21 minimum expenditure to defend a Board against 1 egal attack on 
22 any issue, especially issues related to attacks on were we 
23 prudent in certain investments would be a minimum of one 
24 million dollars, just for the legal defense. That is not for 
25 any punitive or other damages which may be forthcoming. 
26 Up and down the state, for example, our county, we 
27 do pay county counsel's fees out of the operating expenses of 
28 the fund and we also make, have a contractural area for 
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1 ng our own at orney and looking p ri at con ractural 
2 ma ers. 
3 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Mr. Chairman. 
4 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Mr. Elder. 
5 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: If that lion dollar figure 
6 were true, then, you know, many of these people would be out 
7 trying to incite this type of litigation. They wouldn't be 
8 here sti ng. They wo d be in court, wouldn't they? It 
9 would be kind of rd to get anybody to show up here for what 
10 they make here today. It's got to be an hourly fee. 
1 MR. MOORE: As I said, Mr. Elder, the only thing I 
2 
13 
14 
5 
6 
, 
8 
1 
21 
22 
wa q d was a price of what it would estimated to 
defend a rd of retirement against any type of suit. I 
don't know how accurate those figures are, whether they put 
em i 
s hou 
t e 
coun 
any computer model or some attorney was figuring 
t s and s fee or whatever. 
How big is your investment fund? 
MR. We have about million in our fund 
sen 
ER ank you. 
CH RMAN Me RQUODALE: You mentioned the county 
Is it a pro em in b ng able to t the county 
counsel to prov de an adequate at ney with expertise that 
y u need or is it that they're not ava able? 
MR MOORE: I ink it s proba a combination of 
th is t our fund has grown considerably over the ast 
everal years. It's growing at a rate of approximately $200 
28 million a year. We are facing a great de of problems in 
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1 the area of disability, using disability retirements. 
2 Probably a window of suit against us would be someone wherein 
.3 a gravely delayed disability retirement would be provided. 
4 In other words, we'd be going out three or four years based 
5 on lack of counsel or the inability to set up a hearing, a 
6 person loses their house or has some other financial impact 
7 and then would sue the Board. 
8 We have a great many of those disability retirements 
9 pending and the staff of county counsel has not grown 
10 proportionately. So sometimes if you would get into some 
11 degree of problems as I see our particular situation is 
12 approaching, it would certainly give the Board of Retirement 
13 the opportunity to hire some counsel to, say, eliminate some 
14 of those pending disability hearings or if a specialized suit 
15 came down to where county counsel would not particularly have 
16 that expertise or have that availability of staff, it would 
17 certainly give an opportunity for the Board to protect 
18 themselves better. 
19 I think that what my whole point, Mr. Chairman, on 
20 my conversation here, is that if nine members are 
21 individually and collectively responsible under Prop 21 
22 guidelines from what we've heard today, then that Board has 
23 got to have the ability in which to protect those funds and 
24 have the ability in which to deal with those particular 
25 issues without necessarily being dependant upon other 
26 unrelated parties in terms of not assuming any responsibility 
27 themselves. So it's like saying, we have all this 
28 responsibility but no direction or no helm to the ship. It's 
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1 guided by other outside external sources. 
2 SENATOR CARPENTER: Mr. Chairman. 
3 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Mr. Carpenter. 
4 SENATOR CARPENTER: I think the witness is being 
5 very kind to Orange County Counsel. The fact is that Orange 
6 County Counsel is somewhat idiosyncratic. Generalization 
7 should not be taken on the basis of what Orange County 
8 Counsel does as relates to other areas of the state. 
9 MR. BRUNNER: Mr. Chairman, If I might for just a 
10 moment, I don't think I'd probably go quite so far as the 
11 Senator has, but I have to agree that in a lot of respects 
12 he's absolutely accurate. It goes so far as to say that we 
13 have difficulty appointing staff for the administration of 
14 the retirement system because the county has taken the 
15 position that because the Government Code says that the 
16 employees are employees of the County of Orange, therefore, 
17 as you have heard earlier today, they will fix the conditions 
18 of employment, they'll fix the salaries, et cetera. 
19 Yesterday we were in the process of attempting to hire an 
20 administrator a $700 plus million system and we were 
21 quibbling over whether it would be a M-7 or a M-6 rate which 
puts the difference between about ten thousand dollars a 
23 yea • It's our personal opinion, and that was the opinion of 
24 the collective boards and unanimously, that the seven or the 
ne members made by motion elected to go with the M-7 level 
because we f t it would take that amount of money to attract 
27 the expertise to the system. And Prop 21 we felt was our 
28 fiduciary responsibility to get the best help we could for 
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1 that large of a system and for the beneficiaries. 
2 County personnel interjected themselves and 
3 indicated that they were going to go to the Board of 
4 Supervisors as was their right under county personnel salary, 
5 personnel and salary resolutions and recommend the M-6 level. 
6 There's a direct conflict there between the Board of 
7 Retirement and the Board of Supervisors and the duties 
8 between the two. We have a fiduciary responsibility. The 
9 Board of Supervisors does not. It's just that clear. 
10 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: So a definition of 
11 "fiduciary" which would say that you have to have the freedom 
12 to act, that in this case would transfer the fiduciary 
13 responsibility to the Board of Supervisors. 
14 MR. BRUNNER: I don't know if it does or not, sir. 
15 I would hope. 
16 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: If you defined that, would 
17 you see that as an advantage? Would the Board then be 
18 willing to turn over to you-- and we've heard this from San 
19 Bernardino and I've heard this from other 1937 Act counties, 
you're not a county department. Would that be helpful? 
2 MR. BRUNNER: Sir, I don't believe so. I think 
it's going to take more than that. Basically what we end up 
with is an attorney general index letter from 1977, as early 
24 as that, that said that county retirement funds were a trust 
fund and as such they were separate and distinct entities 
26 from county governments. We have a conflict because the 
Government Code, and I believe the Government Code for 
28 reasons of brevity, has placed these people in a category as 
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1 county employees in order to provide them access to the 
2 retirement system and benefits in a salary structure so to 
3 speak. 
4 That's my belief that the original legislation 
5 hinged on, and this Prop 21 has since come along and muddied 
6 
1 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
the waters a little bit, given us the freedom to exercise 
investment opportunities and I think the fund has greatly 
been enhanced from that. 
However, I think that the boards, if we're going to 
be held to fiduciary standards, that we are under ERISA and 
et cetera, will need the latitude to get the best help we can 
and that means a little more freedom in terms of personnel 
selection and counsel selection, et cetera. 
CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Would you see an advantage, 
assuming you could do it under Prop 21, of the Legislature 
narr ng your responsibility and identifying you in some of 
these areas? 
MR. BRUNNER: I think that would be beneficial if 
19 that were the response • 
• MOORE: I think that you're answering part of 
21 the question, too, is that we're dealing with a law that was 
22 prior to Prop 21. The Government Code is very vague, but it, 
we're dealing th a Government Code prior to Proposition 21 
24 and there has been no substantial change in the Government 
Code in these relationships that we're talking about after 
Proposition 21. 
So consequently the 20 some 37 Act counties up and 
28 down the state do business 20 different ways. There is no 
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1 uniformity and I think basically because you have 20 county 
2 counsels, and you have 20 sets of boards who are all looking 
3 at this code in some different light. So I would think that 
4 the only way to kind of smooth that out and kind of define it 
5 a little more is to look at some legislation that would give 
6 individual boards of retirement more autonomy. 
7 If I am a member and a fiduciary of that Board, I 
8 don't mind taking the heat, but I want to have the control of 
9 my own destiny so to speak and at least be able to make 
10 choices and decisions without being hampered by outside 
11 sources that may have a different agenda than I do or may be 
12 looking at a situation differently than I do but who 
13 ultimately will have no responsibility whether it goes belly 
14 up. 
15 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Mr. Chairman. So you would be 
16 opposed to the concept of eliminating, just repealing the 37 
17 Act entirely since it doesn't mean anything anyway? 
18 MR. MOORE: I'm not suggesting that. 
19 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: So what you would think is a 
total rewrite? 
21 MR. MOORE: I would suggest that certain parts of 
the code be looked at. I did not mean to make a blanket 
23 statement that the 37 Act as now written is bad or is not, in 
24 certain areas not clear. However, in the areas that I have 
discussed, in areas of counsel, in areas of the reporting 
relationship between staff and the boards of retirement, I 
think those need to be looked at and clarified a little more 
28 specifically. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Our experience is that there's 
no uniformity. Every county does their own thing anyway. 
They are creatures, the retirement boards are creatures of 
the county in which they're located. So the 37 Act really 
doesn't operate much the way that the PERS legi ation does. 
MR. MOORE: But therein 1 ies the problem, Sen a tor. 
This is a tru fund. It's not a fund that just, or is an 
adjunct of county government. It's a trust fund there for 
the beneficiaries of the funds, clearly stated in the Act. 
MR. BRUNNER: Senator, if I might expand on that 
just for one minute -- Mr. Chairman, excuse me. 
Basically it is a trust fund. We recognize that the 
County of Orange in this case has a great deal of concern 
because it's one of the major expenditures of county 
government. The benefits and retirement payments are a 
great expense to the counties. 
We feel that by the fact that they do have four 
representatives, four appointed representatives to the Board 
of Retirement, that there are four elected members to the 
Board of Retirement and then the ex-officio member, that 
being Treasurer-Tax Collector, they have the input that 
they need to safeguard their interest in the retirement fund 
and to go beyond that and give them controls outside of that 
over the d limits the ability of the fund to respond to 
the nancial world and to the real world in terms of 
counsel, et cetera. 
CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Dave had a question. 
MR FELDERSTEIN: Since the enactment of legislation 
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1 putting Prop 21 into effect for 37 Act counties, have there 
2 been any examples of times that the Retirement Board wanted 
3 to obtain investment counsel on specific problems they were 
4 having or investment they wanted to make or areas they wanted 
5 to get into when the Board of Supervisors didn't comply with 
6 the request to obtain investment counsel? 
7 MR. MOORE: Not in particularly in investment 
8 counsel, and that area is still untested waters. Basically 
9 for the last year-- we're just now getting into a whole 
10 asset allocation plan and locking ourselves into divesting 
11 the funds into various areas in real estate. Venture capital 
12 was mentioned. We do have some money now invested in venture 
13 capital. So I perceive that those areas will have perhaps 
14 sometime in the future some areas of concern for the Board of 
15 Retirement. 
16 In direct answer to your question, right at the 
17 present time, no. 
18 MR. FELDERSTEIN: There have been disputes in the 
19 past over, as you mentioned, disability retirement cases 
20 perhaps or other areas. I was trying to hone in on as the 
21 investment counsel question whether you have tried to do it 
and they said no. Do you think we need some reforms just in 
23 that specific area of obtaining investment counsel for the 
24 Retirement Board? 
MR. MOORE: I think if you look at counsel, 
26 investment counsel, yo~ 1 re looking at, and you're looking at 
counsel generically, whether you're sued or its investment is 
28 the protection of the fund, I think any counsel that you get 
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1 or hopefully have is going to be your immune system to either 
2 faulty contracts, frivolous lawsuits or somebody suing you 
3 based on bad, on investment performance. 
4 I don't see that you can separate one issue from the 
5 other issue. Your responsibility is the protection of the 
6 total fund no matter where the attack may come from. 
7 CHA MAN McCORQUODALE: Okay. If you have 
8 suggestions at any point, feel free to send them in on fine 
9 tuning it. I think generally we like the idea of being able 
10 to have greater flexibility in investments. We don't want 
11 Mr. Brunner to go through life doing the first thing every 
12 morning checking the warrants to see if there's a warrant out 
13 on him. So if you see areas that we ought to be dealing 
14 with, let us know. 
15 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much and we appreciate 
16 your invitation. 
17 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Next witness is Carol Stick, 
18 Sacramento County Employees• Retirement Association. 
19 MS. STICK: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, my 
20 name is Carol Stick. I'm the Sacramento County Treasurer-Tax 
21 Collector. I have a very brief presentation to make today. 
22 The prudent expert standards delineated in 
Proposition 21 impose express standards of care on the 
Sacramento Coun Board of Retirement and its officers and 
employees. 
The duties and responsibility of the individuals who 
27 control the fund are quite clearly stated. That is, the 
28 Board members must a with the care, skill, prudence and 
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1 diligence that a prudent person in a like capacity and 
2 familiar with these matters would use in conduct of an 
3 enterprise of a like character and with like aim. 
4 Considering that none of the Board members bring 
5 with them specific knowledge of investments by virtue of 
6 qualifications they must possess to be a Board member, few of 
7 them have great confidence in their individual skill in 
8 overseeing a fund of one-half billion dollars. 
9 Realizing that a trustee's lack of familiarity with 
10 an investment is no excuse for inappropriate investment 
11 decisions, the Sacramento County Board of Retirement has 
12 sought outside assistance. However, blind reliance on the 
' 
13 advice of an advisor does not lessen the Board's 
14 responsibility to evaluate the prudence of a particular 
15 investment. The delegation of responsibility for investment 
16 decisions to independent professionals may reduce the Board's 
17 exposure to liability under the prudence rule, but it stops 
18 short of building a pool of knowledgeable Board members who 
19 can bring forward a high degree of oversight to the process. 
Although the Board's duties are clearly stated and 
21 the ability to hire professional investment managers is 
equally clear, the means of developing an informed opinion is 
not. If the most basic responsibility of the Board under the 
prudent expert standard is to act prudently in all investment 
matters, then the most obvious need is education of the 
Board. 
27 Therefore, I believe the statute should be amended 
28 to allow educational costs to be a charge against the assets 
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5 addressed. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Would that include speaking fees 
for edgea e people in subject area? 
MS. ' it w d. 
I re rement systems that are inde ent, the 
co s of education are a cost of admi ering the system and 
er ore a cost to t sy em. However, in Sacramento 
oun where ral fund monies are used to pay 
strat e expenses, approp ations for education are 
icult to come by in times of financial constraint. 
ow e , e res i for prudence remains 
ore, I re ctful uest fav ora bl e 
21 consi dera on of an amendment to 1 n ude education of B card 
22 members to be an expense of investing monies as found in 
cti n 31596 1 of Californi Government Code. 
24 nk you 
LYMAN w these people to be 
26 e geable? I me n t ie.s in the ce of, you know, 
what ese pe e out here are selling. You're 1 ng to be 
e ev t them nd h d them e lev of 
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1 performance. I mean, geez, this is really kind of ratical, 
2 isn't it? 
3 MS. STICK: I've decided after hearing testimony 
4 today to quit my job as Treasurer-Tax Collector and go back 
5 to law school. I've got all sorts of things to spend that 
6 million dollars on. 
7 (Laughter.) 
8 MS. STICK: I have no other comments. 
9 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: I probably should have asked 
10 the other members who were Board members the question, but 
11 from your standpoint looking at it, does the Board have 
12 enough direct involvement in the investments to qualify as 
13 being fiduciaries or should they be excluded from being 
14 fiduciaries? 
15 MS. STICK: In Sacramento County the Board members 
16 are very directly involved in the hiring of the managers. We 
17 don't run much of the money internally. Therefore, the Board 
18 members are not involved in day-to-day investments. However, 
19 they do hire the managers and they have set goals and 
20 objectives for each one of those managers and they have set 
21 goals and objectives for the entire retirement system 
22 investment program. 
23 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: Would it be better than to 
24 try to insure that Board members learned enough to be able to 
25 protect themselves and to act appropriately on a broad range 
26 or would it be better to narrow their responsibility and 
27 indemnify them in other areas so that they just wouldn't be, 
28 you wouldn't have to worry about them getting sued or a 
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held accountable for 
that it s a riate that we be 
millions of dollars and the 
tentia liti tion at•s been d scussed t I do 
ieve the Board members need be more educated, more 
knowledgea e what they're doing. But I also would agree 
with one of the other speakers that if we are held personally 
liable, en ust be e to make more decisions about 
sta ng and resource de oyme 
CH RMAN McCORQUODALE: 
n we current are. 
I've heard the same 
com aints I think one the other -- they said that 
of S isors j never deals with the issue. 
ppose you turned t around so that you gave the law that 
e ste at Board of upervisors w have v o power 
ac t would only have the ri t to turn it down. 
f the Retirem Board wanted to do 
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to do t and w dn't have tow t for 
ov e Board but a e to, if th Board 
t act in d s, it com s final 
proces • 
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1 county supervisor. I remember, I think some things when I 
2 went on in '72 were still waiting for action by the Board in 
3 '82. 
4 MS. STICK: We don't really have a problem in 
5 Sacramento County with the Board of Supervisors. The one 
6 problem I suppose we face is, with all counties, is that 
7 retirement has been a bit of an orphan and I don't think that 
8 the potential and the impact on the retirement system has 
9 been truly understood by county management. We do need more 
10 staff, more sophisticated staff and it's hard to buy at any 
11 level with what counties are willing to pay. 
12 I'm not sure that that's necessarily a problem with 
13 the Board of Supervisors or whether that's a problem with the 
14 Board of Retirement. I don't think any of us have really 
15 gone through and thought through the process well enough to 
16 understand what we truly need. There are a great many 
17 outside advisors who can help us and perhaps that's what we 
18 need to do and not try to build that base internally. But 
19 then again we certainly need enough sophistication internally 
20 to oversee our advisors. I don't know what the answer is, 
21 Senator. 
22 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: What do you see specifically 
23 precludes you from doing the educational, making expenditures 
24 for educational purposes for the Board. Is it the Board of 
25 Supervisors' act or is it --
26 MS. STICK: It is not specifically listed as one of 
27 those charges which can be a charge against the assets of the 
28 system. Therefore, since it's not specifically allowed, we 
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consider it disallowed. Sacramento Co Re rement stem 
is not an independent fund as is San Berna no Coun 
cost admin ering system are borne the general 
d Sacramento County 
The only expenses that can be a arge agai the 
6 system are the actuaries cost and some investment-r ated 
7 expenses. If I went to a conference that had some discussion 
8 on investment and some discussion on benefits, I m not sure 
9 if I could arge at ba as an investment- ated expense, 
10 and that's why I wanted the clarification in the code. 
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1 MS. STICK: That's correct. Yes. 
2 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: And that's what the county 
3 charges for its administrative function as it relates to your 
4 Board for EDP charges, county counsel, et cetera, et cetera? 
5 MS. STICK: We've not, we have not reimbursed the 
6 county for anything but the investment-related expenses. We 
7 have not reimbursed county counsel or systems and data 
8 processing. We were reimbursed for the accountants who watch 
9 the investment activity for some computerized software 
10 systems that the county has purchased for us for some 
11 equipment that we've purchased and utilized. 
12 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Rent? 
13 MS. STICK: None of the overhead. 
14 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: They give you space in the 
15 building? 
16 MS. STICK: Yes. I'm the Treasurer-Tax Collector. 
17 So I'm a slightly different situation than those other 
18 speakers. 
19 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: You're appointed. 
MS. STICK: Yes, sir, I am. I'm one of three 
21 appointed treasurers in the state and by virtue of my job I 
have a vote on the Retirement Board. 
23 ASSEMBLYMAN ELDER: Okay. 
24 CHAIRMAN McCORQUODALE: All right. Very good. 
25 Well, thank you. Appreciate your comments. 
26 That concludes our list of speakers. If you have 
27 comments that you would like to have added to the record, 
28 feel free to get them in in the next few days and we'll 
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PERS also retained the services of Wilshire Associates in April 1984. 
Wilshire Associates provides consulting services to a broad spectrun of 
retir~ent systems. Their range of services include helping a system determine 
its funding needs, appropriate investment alternatives for meeting those 
funding needs, asset allocation targets, investment policy and objectives, 
investment strategies, investment plans, manager selection, performance 
monitoring and evaluation of why performance is as it is, and ongoing 
consulting services. 
PERS has used most of the range of services available from Wilshire. 
TABS C, D, and G in the binder contain some of Wilshire's most important 
reports toPERS. The voluminous collection of Wilshire materials in our 
files is available for review by your staff and will be provided to ypu if you 
feel the need. The material in the binder provides a comprehensive overview 
of the issues which PERS has addressed. 
Since you have already heard testimony on most of the steps in defining a 
sound investment process, I will only touch on the most critical aspects of the 
process. 
The fiduciary is charged with the duty of insuring that a comprehensive, 
rational, and replicable process is utilized in the management of the 
retirement program. The basic steps that PERS has utilized are probably 
applicable to all retirement systems. 
PERS has sought to answer the following questions in as disciplined a 
manner as possible: 
(1) What is our fiduciary duty? (TAB B) 
(2) What are PERS' funding needs? (TAB C) 
(3) What risks are associated with the returns on various investment 
vehicles? (TAB C) 
(4) How much risk should PERS accept in its efforts to maximize returns? 
(TAB C) 
(5) How shoUld PERS allocate its assets to meet its funding needs? (TAB C) 
(6) ~hat investment policies and objectives will best serve PERS' funding 
needs? (TAB D) 
(7) How should PERS implement its investment policies and objectives? 
(TAB E) 
(8) What investment activities should be performed by PERS' staff or 
external managers? (TAB E) 
(9) What qualifications should be required of internal staff? (TAB E) 
(10) wr.at qualifications should be required of external managers? (TAB F) 
(11) How much should we be willing to pay for investment services? (TAB F) 
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as possible ••• 
Mission 
The California Public Employees' Retirement Sys-
tem promotes and administers an equitable and 
financially sound program of eamed retirement, 
disability, death, and health benefits for participat-. 
ing public employees, retirees, and beneficiaries. 
Goals 
The PERS Board of Administration and Staff strive 
to: 
• Conduct all programs in accordance with the 
highest fiduciary standards on behalf of PERS' 
employers for the exclusive benefit of their 
employees, retirees, and beneficiaries. 
• Administer all programs in a reasonable, 
responsive, and consistent manner using inte-
grated, cost-effective, and efficient service 
standards, procedures, and practices. 
• Manage growth and change by implementing 
innovative and anticipatory solutions. 
• Provide human resource programs to recruit, 
train, develop, and promote qualified staff. 
• Maximize investment returns and minimize 
long-term costs by using sound investment and 
actuarial policies and practices. 
• Promote understanding of PERS' programs 
among members, employers, state officials, and 
the public. 
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"INVESTING THE OF PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS IN CALIFORNIA: 
FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE PRUDENT PERSON RULE." 
JOHN J. GRAF 
VICE PRESIDENT AND REGIONAL MANAGER 
CITICORP INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INC. 
SAN FRANCISCO 
GOOD AFTERNOON· MY NAME IS JOHN GRAFJ lAM VIcE PRESIDENT AND REGIONAL MANAGER 
FOR (ITICORP INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT IN SAN FRANCISCO} WHERE WE HAVE 
NoN-DISCRETIONARY INVESTMENT ADVISORY REPONSIBILITIES FOR A SEGMENT OF THE PERS 
COMMON STOCK PORTFOLIO· 
1 HAVE BEEN ASKED TO TALK ABOUT HOW PROPOSITION 21 AFFECTED OUR ROLE AS EQUITY 
INVESTMENT ADVISOR TO PERS. FURTHER1 1 HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO DISCUSS HOW WE 
AS AN INVESTMENT MANAGER DISCHARGE OUR FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY AS WE GO 
THROUGH THE INVESTMENT PROCESS· 
SINCE WE ADVISE ONLY ON THE ACTIVELY MANAGED EQUITY SEGMENT OF THE PERS FUND 1 
THE ISSUE OF OVERALL ASSET MlX1 THAT IS THE RATIO OF STOCKS1 BONDS) REAL ESATEJ 
ETC· WAS NEVER WITHIN OUR SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITY· 
As YOU KNOW) PROP 21 ELIMINATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS WHICH MAY HAVE 
BEEN APPROPRIATE TO THE SITUATION 20 YEARS EARLIER1 BUT BECAME AN UNNECESSARY 
AND POTENTIALLY COSTLY ENCUMBERANCE IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES· IN ADDITION 
TO THE 25% LIMITATION ON EQUITIES1 PRE-PROP 21 CONSTRAINTS INCLUDED THE 
FOLLOWING CRITERIA FOR INDIVIDUAL COMMON STOCK INVESTMENTS: 
1· ALL COMPANIES MUST BE INCORPORATED IN THE U.S. 
2· ALL COMPANIES MUST BE LISTED ON A NATIONAL EXCHANGE 
3. A COMPANY MUST HAVE TOTAL ASSETS IN EXCESS OF $100 MILLION 
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4. OF COMPAN ES IN WHICH EQUITY CO~~ITMENTS WERE BE OF IGH 
QUALITY 
5. THE COMPANY HAVE PAID DIVIDENDS IN EIGHT OF THE LAST TEN YEARS 
5. EARNINGS FOR THAT PERIOD MUST AGGREGATE DIVIDENDS PAID AND DIVIDENDS FOR 
EACH OF THE LAST YEARS MUST HAVE BEEN EARNED IN THE YEAR PAID· 
GUIDELINES PRECLUDED INVESTMENT IN MANY COMPANIES WHICH WERE COMING OUT 
OF THE 1982 RECESSION AFTER HAVING RESTRUCTURED THEIR OPERATIONS AND TAKEN ONE 
TIME WRITE-OFFS· SUCH COMPANIES INCLUDED EASTMAN KODAK) CATERPILLAR TRACTOR) 
AMERICAN TELEPHONE & AND GENERAL MoTORS· lT ALSO PRECLUDED COMPANIES 
WHICH HAD DECIDED NOT TO PAY A DIVI 
COMPANY'S FUTURE GROWTH· 
BUT RATHER TO REINVEST EARNINGS IN THE 
WERE ALSO LIM TS ON THE AMOUNT OF THE COMPANY PERS COULD OWN (5%) AND THE 
OF WHICH COULD BE INVESTED IN A SINGLE COMMON STOCK 
ADVI WAS TO SUBSTANTI 
OF PROPOSITION 21 ON OUR FUNCTION AS EQUITY 
EXPAND THE UNIVERSE OF COMPANIES FROM WHICH TO 
WERE ABOUT 200 STOCKS ON THE PERS LIST OF CHOOSE· M 
IZED I - (IT CORP'S LI WAS APPROXIMATELY 3 TIMES AS LARGE· 
OF ACTUAL DID NOT INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY AS A RESULT 
OF lTlON PO IS THAT PERS HAD ACCESS TO A WIDER ARRAY OF 
OPPORTUNITIES· 
NUMBER OF TI 
BECAUSE OF PERS 1 LARGE SIZEJ A SIGNIFICANT 
COMPANIES WERE NOT CONSIDERED FOR INVESTMENT BECAUSE 
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PERS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A LARGE POSITION IN A SMALLER COMPANY TO GET A 
MEANINGFUL DOLLAR EXPOSURE IN THE PORTFOLIO· FoR INSTANCE, TO INVEST 1/2 OF 1% 
OF THE ACTIVE SEGMENT OF THE PERS FUND IN A COMPANY WITH 1/4 BILLION DOLLARS IN 
STOCK OUTSTANDING, WOULD REQUIRE TAKING A 10% POSITION IN THE COMPANY· (1 
MIGHT ADD PARENTHETICALLY THAT THE RECENT MOVES BY PERS TO FRACTURE THAT FUND 
AND GIVE SMALL PIECES TO MANAGERS WITH COMPLIMENTARY STYLES, WILL GET AROUND 
THAT PROBLEM.) 
WHILE REMOVING THE CONSTRAINTS, PROPOSTION 21 ALSO REQUIRED THAT THE FUNDS BE 
INVESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ERISA STANDARDS AND THE PRUDENT ExPERT RULE· 
(EssENTIALLY, THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PORTFOLIO WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE EXACTING 
DEGREE OF CARE THAT A PRUDENT, KNOWLEDGEABLE INVESTOR, FAMILIAR WITH THE 
f\1\t-,;: .~:::::; VJC:UU} EXERC l SE-) 
PROP 21 ALSO MANDATED THAT WE, AS ADVISORS, PERFORM OUR DUTIES EXCLUSIVELY IN 
INTEREST OF PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIARIES· 
lASTLY, THE MEASURE REQUIRED THAT INVESTMENTS BE DIVERSIFIED SO AS TO MINIMIZE 
THE RISK OF LOSS· THE OVERALL EQUITY PORTFOLIO, INCLUDING THE ACTIVE AND 
PASSIVE SEGMENTS, WAS ALREADY WELL-DIVERSIFIED SO THIS HAD LITTLE IMPACT ON OUR 
ACT IV IT I ES • 
lN TERMS OF THE INVESTMENT PROCESS, BOTH WITHIN (ITICORP AND AS IT RELATES TO 
PERS, WE ALWAYS VIEWED OURSELVES AS FIDUCIARIES - EVEN PRIOR TO PROP 21. !N 
ALL OF OUR INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THAT FOR PERS, WE WERE GUIDED BY 
THE NOTION OF 0 EXCLUSIVE BENEFIT," AND FELT WE WOULD ALWAYS BE HELD TO THE 
STANDARDS OF THE ERSTWHILE "PRUDENT MAN" RULE, EVEN PRIOR TO ERISA. 
0 
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THE MATTER OF HOW PRUDENCE IS MAINTAINED MECHANI WITHIN (ITICORP, 
THERE ARE CHECK POINTS: 
0 
0 
0 
ARE GOVERNED BY THE INVESTMENT ADVISORS OF 
INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES ARE MONITORED BY INDEPENDENT AUDITORS WHO REPORT 
TO THE FIDUCIARY IEW COMMITTEE OF THE TlCORP 
A ITTEE OF SEN OR PORTFOLIO MANAGERS REVIEWS ACCOUNTS EACH YEAR TO BE 
THAT THEY INVESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GOVERNING DOCUMENTS AND 
CLIENT OBJECTIVES· 
TRANSACTIONS ARE MONITORED DAILY AND AGGREGATE PORTFOLIO 
DIVERSIF CATI REVIEWED MONTHLY FOR COMPL ANCE TO OUR PREVAILING 
POLICY· 
0 (ITICORP HAS A WRITTEN POLICY REGARDING EXCLUSIVE BENEFIT WHICH REQUIRES 
UNDIV DED OUR CLIENTS· THIS AFFECTS SLCH ITEMS AS: 
NG MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH BROKERS WHO PROVIDE THE 
AND PRICE EFFECTIVE EXECUTIONS· 
USING (ITICORP'S MONEY MARKET DESK OR OUR 
D BROKERAGE UNIT WHEN COMPLETING TRADES· 
MAY BUY ANY TICORP SECURITIES FOR OUR CLIENTS· 
INVESTED CASH BALANCES MUST BE KEPT AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL· 
IO MANAGERS MUST PRIOR CLEARANCE BEFORE COMPLETING 
FOR THEIR IOS IGNED TO PREVENT DEALING IN STOCKS 
WH CH BEING PURCHASED OR SOLD FOR CLIENTs). 
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WE ALSO DISCHARGE OUR DAY-TO-DAY OBLIGATIONS TO BE PRUDENT THROUGH ONGOING 
IC AND INVESTMENT RESEARCH, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF A HIGHLY QUALIFIED 
OF ANALYSTS, PORTFOLIO MANAGERS AND TRADERS· So OUR FIDUCIARY 
RESPONSIBILITY BEGINS WITH A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF CLIENT OBJECTIVES AND 
TOLERANCE FOR RISK, AND THE CONSTRUCTION AND ONGOING MAINTENANCE OF A PORTFOLIO 
RESPONSIVE TO THESE REQUIREMENTS, AND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR INVESTMENT 
OUTLOOK· 
lN ESSENCE, PROP 21 AS IT RELATED TO PRUDENCE AND FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY, DID 
NOT ALTER THE WAY WE WERE WORKING WITH PERS. WE CONTINUED TO MEET WITH THE 
INVESTMENT COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD EVERY OTHER MONTH TO REPORT ON INVESTMENT 
POLICY AND THE PORTFOLIO· OUR RESEARCH MATERIAL CONTINUED TO BE SENT TO THE 
ST,._r-;-,~ WTTH "!liOM 1llE HAD VIRTUALLY DAILY PHONE CONTl\CT CO~~C'ER~:JNG OUR P~VESTMENT 
RECOMMENDATIONS· AND, AS IN THE PAST, WE WOULD MEET WITH THE STAFF AS NEEDED 
TO DISCUSS STRATEGY• THE MAJOR CHANGE FROM PROP 21 WITH REGARD TO OUR ROLE WAS 
THE LATITUDE AFFORDED BY THE ELIMINATION OF CONSTRAINTS· 
1 WELCOME YOUR QUESTIONS· 
0 Page 5 of 5 
I. 
ETHAN 
OF CALIFORNIA 
HEARINGS 
11, 1986 
name is Ethan I am a in the national law firm 
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its wake. 
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such as banks, insurance companies and 
duty matters. It is fair to say 
sector 
and 
I 
purpose 
21 and the 
this legislation was to 
cities to 
I address myself to issues 
federal law govern private 
sector employers. I will also touch on issues relating to indemnity, fiduciary 
insurance and the payment of advisers fees. 
II. Allocation of Responsibilities 
Although not an immutable law of natural science, fiduciary duty 
allocations are almost inevitable in the context of large pension plans. These plans 
are simply too big and too complex to run by any one person or board in all 
respects. The issues that arise in connection with the allocation of fiduciary 
responsibility are these: 
(1) Are the allocations authorized by the plan and by applicable law? Are both 
duties and the legal responsibility for the conduct of those duties being 
allocated (or are just the duties being allocated with the legal responsibility 
being retained by the delegating fiduciary)? 
(2) What residual responsibility does an allocating fiduciary have with respect 
to the allocated function (e.g., supervision)? 
(3) To what extent is one fiduciary legally responsible for duties which are the 
responsibility of another fiduciary? 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 
establishes the sole body of fiduciary duty rules applicable to private sector pension 
plans. These rules were intended to be a rational codification of provisions of 
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powers 
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no is liable for 
are not 
investments, the 
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most 
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ERISA permits the allocation or delegation of non-investment 
management fiduciary responsibilities in a more liberal fashion, with greater 
exculpation of the delegating fiduciaries. 
On the other hand, ERISA imposes co-fiduciary liability on non-
breaching fiduciaries in certain cases in which another fiduciary breaches its duties. 
Such "co-fiduciary" liability only arises when the first fiduciary is not directly liable 
for the breach. Co-fiduciary liability is imposed when another fiduciary breaches its 
duty and the non-breaching fiduciary participates in the breach, knowingly helps to 
conceal the breach, permits the breach to occur by a breach of its own duties or 
knows of the breach but fails to take steps to remedy it. 
Most importantly, ERISA imposes personal liability on plan fiduciaries for 
losses to the plan resulting from breaches of their own or from co-fiduciary breaches. In 
addition, ERISA authorizes injunctive relief to prevent breaches from occurring or to 
cause them to be remedied. 
California law, in contrast to ERISA, appears to have a very undeveloped 
set of fiduciary responsibility allocation rules and liability rules. Only STERS 
imposes personal liability on fiduciaries for breaches of duty. Other public 
retirement systems may be governed by a similar rule but it was not included in the 
Proposition 21 enabling legislation. None of the Proposition 21 enabling legislation 
appears to have explicitly authorized equitable relief to enjoin or remedy breaches. 
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permits 
may not be permitted to do so. 
retirement systems board from 
with am aware 
systems 
statutes expressly exculpates a 
for decisions made an investment 
manager. State law appears not to include any co-fiduciary liability provisions like 
ERISA's, except for the STERS statutes which duplicates them. 
Without equitable remedies or damages, the duty rules are 
almost meaningless. It is little wonder that there is some confusion on what kinds of 
investments are permitted under the "prudent person" rule. This rule is a remedy-
::_c_:~c:...::: rule which arose out of case law and constituted a judicial standard for 
reviewing trustee to how reasonable it was and 
whether liability should imposed. The prudent man does not tell fiduciaries 
what to do; it is a standard for 
were improper. 
the fact whether their decisions 
III. 
can suffer personal for breaches fiduciary 
there is no or Only the STERS statutes, as 
I to 
Such as I is imposed on 
sector It is very common private sector employers 
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to indemnify or insure plan fiduciaries from liabilities arising from non-willful 
breaches of fiduciary duties. Plans cannot provide this kind of indemnity or 
insurance under ERISA since that would render the fiduciary liability provisions 
meaningless. (Plans, of course, are permitted to indemnify fiduciaries from legal 
defense costs incurred in successfully defending claims that they breached their 
duties. Plans can also insure themselves from losses caused by fiduciary breaches, 
provided there is recourse against the fiduciary.) 
Fiduciary insurance may be less common than it used to be. The cost for 
coverage has skyrocketed recently and greater limitations have been imposed on 
the coverage which is available. 
Both the STERS and PERS legislation have express fiduciary insurance 
provisions authorizing (or even requiring) the purchase of certain kinds of fiduciary 
It is important to note the relationship between fiduciary responsibility, 
fiduciary liability and fiduciary exculpation (through insurance, indemnity or 
The fiduciary duty rules have no meaning or significant impact unless 
fiduciaries are liable for their breaches or unless injunctive relief or other equitable 
remedies are available to deal with such breaches. On the other hand, if personal 
liability is imposed, it is difficult in a litigious age such as ours to get individuals to 
serve as fiduciaries. That is, it is difficult to get them to serve unless insurance or 
indemnities are made available. Once insurance or indemnities are made available, 
the impact of the fiduciary responsibility rules is largely undermined. Moreover 
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when fiduciary liability insurance becomes ""A'""'"''" 
for the state to impose liability and then to pay the cost of insuring against it. In 
other words, it might be more cost effective and just as meaningful to impose a 
lesser duty of fiduciary care. 
IV. Conclusion 
State law implementing Proposition 21 appears to be something of a 
patchwork. The implementing provisions vary widely. It would make sense to make 
all these provisions parallel each other except where unique factors relating to a 
specific retirement system justify deviation from the general rule. 
The STERS statutes come closest to paralleling ERISA, but they come 
too close. They impose personal liability for breaches of fiduciary duty as well as 
personal liability for co-fiduciary breaches. They also establish prohibited 
transaction rules which are similar to those in ERISA. Prohibited transaction rules 
are simply prohibitions on self-dealing transactions (for example, loans between a 
and a related to the plan) and the STERS statutes impose liabilities on 
fiduciaries for entering into these kinds of transactions. The only major ERISA 
fiduciary responsibility provision which the STERS statutes do not clearly include is 
one which would make equitable relief available to enjoin or otherwise remedy 
breaches of fiduciary duty. 
In of practical necessity protecting fiduciaries from personal 
liability in order to get fiduciaries to serve large plans and in view of the fact that 
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exculpation by insurance or indemnity takes the teeth out of the liability provisions 
the place and can be very expensive to provide, it may make more sense for 
the state to limit fiduciary liability provisions so as only to impose liability on non-
professional fiduciaries who intentionally breach their fiduciary duties or engage in 
reckless conduct breaching fiduciary duties. Good faith breaches would be exempt in 
such a formulation. Of course, professional fiduciaries (~, banks and investment 
managers) should be held to a stricter ERISA-type standard of care. This would 
greatly reduce the need or demand for fiduciary liability insurance and impose about 
the same net standard of care as is common in the private sector. 
It might also be appropriate to authorize equitable relief to remedy or 
prevent breaches of fiduciary duty and, since money damages would not be available 
in such cases, it would be appropriate to use more strict ERISA-like standards for 
breach of fiduciary duty. To the extent that equitable relief is ordered, the plan 
be permitted to indemnify non-professional fiduciaries for any personal 
expenses incurred in defending such suits except to the extent the breach of 
fiduciary duty appears to have been willful or reckless. 
It would also appear to be appropriate for retirement system fiduciaries 
to be permitted to rely on an outside investment manager without any personal 
liability at all, except to the extent that they recklessly or intentionally breached 
their fiduciary duties in the way they retained or supervised the investment manager, 
thereby permitting a breach to occur. It may also be appropriate to permit all 
governmental plans to retain investment managers (county plans appear prohibited 
under the Proposition 21 implementing provisions) and to permit all governmental 
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plans to pay the cost of outside investment advisers, managers and legal counsel 
from the retirement funds themselves to the extent they deem it to be reasonably 
helpful or necessary to the proper investment management of the fund. 
Whether fiduciary liability insurance for the benefit of the plan is 
appropriate should be left to the investment management discretion of the plan 
itself. Fiduciary insurance protection for the benefit of fiduciaries would be largely 
unnecessary if the suggestions made in my statement were implemented. 
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